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Animal Liberation and the Law: Animals
Board the Underground Railroad
LAURA G. KNIAZt
This Comment provides an analysis of direct action.1 Direct
action is the use of clandestine, illegal tactics to (1) free animals,2
(2) educate the public about the oppression of nonhumans, and (3)
inflict economic harm on animal enterprises.3 Part I provides an
overview of animal protection philosophies and tactics. Part II fo-
cuses on the philosophy and tactics of animal liberators, the seg-
ment of the animal protection movement that engages in direct ac-
tion. Part III explores why animal liberators may believe lawful
means of advocacy do not sufficiently protect nonhumans, while
Part IV measures the success of liberators' illegal efforts. Part V
assesses the backlash against animal liberators. This backlash in-
cludes the prosecution of liberators under traditional criminal stat-
utes, the creation of federal and state laws designed to deter
animal liberation crimes, the activation of numerous grand jury in-
vestigations, and the anticipated use of the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)4 against liberators. Finally,
Part VI proposes several alternatives to this backlash that could
help curb animal liberation crimes while furthering the humane
treatment of nonhumans.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF THE ANIMAL PROTECTION MOVEMENT
I must interpret the life about me as I interpret the life that is my own. My
life is full of meaning to me. The life around me must be full of significance
to itself. If I am to expect others to respect my life, then I must respect the
other life I see, however strange it may be to mine .... We need a bound-
t J.D., University at Buffalo, 1995. The author would like to express her sincere grati-
tude to Sean R. Day for his support and assistance in the development of this Comment.
1. The terms direct action and animal liberation activities will be used interchangea-
bly to refer to covert, illegal acts performed by activists to protect nonhuman animals.
2. The terms animals or nonhumans will be used to refer to nonhuman animals.
3. The terms animal enterprises, animal industry, animal users, and animal facilities
refer to businesses that profit from animal use. These industries include, but are not limited
to, agri-business (i.e., animal based agriculture), slaughterhouses, animal research laborato-
ries, fur farms and furriers, rodeos, zoos, and circuses.
4. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968 (West 1984 & Supp. 1994).
765
766 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43
less ethics which will include the animals also.5
- Dr. Albert Schweitzer
A. The Use of Animals
Every year, humans kill billions of animals for food, clothing,
entertainment, and research. More than four billion cows, steer,
sheep, lambs, pigs, chickens and turkeys are raised and slaughtered
annually to satisfy Americans' appetite for meat, dairy, and eggs.'
Between ten and one hundred million animals are killed yearly in
United States laboratories." Over sixteen million dogs, cats, and
5. Albert Schweitzer, Civilization and Ethics, in THE EXTENDED CIRCLE: A COMMON-
PLACE BOOK OF ANIMAL RIGHTS 314 (Jon Wynne-Tyson ed., 1985); see also Albert Schweit-
zer, The Ethic of Reverence for Life, in ANIMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN OBLIGATIONS 133-38
(Tom Regan & Peter Singer eds., 1976) (furnishing an extended excerpt from ALBERT
SCHWEITZER, CIVILIZATION AND ETHICS).
6. Schweitzer, Civilization and Ethics, supra note 5. Animals used to produce milk and
eggs are ultimately killed for their flesh and skins when their production levels wane. In the
United States, almost all farm animals are raised under intensive farming conditions. These
nonhumans suffer commonplace cruelties such as castration, branding, debeaking, detoeing,
separation of mother and young, intensive confinement, difficult transport, and painful
slaughter. For an overview of the treatment of animals used for food, see MICHAEL W. FOX,
FARM ANIMALS: HUSBANDRY, BEHAVIOR AND VETERINARY PRACTICE (1984); RUTH HARRISON,
ANIMAL MACHINES (1964); JIM MASON & PETER SINGER, ANIMAL FACTORIES (1980); JOHN ROB-
BINS, DIET FOR A NEW AMERICA 48-145 (1987); PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION 95-157 (2d
ed. 1990) [hereinafter SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION]; Jim Mason, Brave New Farm?, in IN
DEFENSE OF ANIMALs 89 (Peter Singer ed., 1985) [hereinafter Mason, Brave New Farm?].
7. The exact number of animals used in research is unknown. Animal protection activ-
ists have claimed that as many as 100 million laboratory animals are used annually in the
United States. In 1986, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment projected an
annual figure of approximately 22 million. It has been argued that "[n]o truly accurate
figures exist, however, because there are no requirements for all facilities that use animals to
report all species to any central agency." HEIDI J. WELSH, ANIMAL TESTING AND CONSUMER
PRODUCTS 129 (1990).
8. Though proponents of animal experimentation argue that such research is essential
to ensure human health, e.g., American Medical Association, Use of Animals in Biomedical
Research: The Challenge and Response 1-2 (1992 revised) (unpublished white paper) [here-
inafter AMA White Paper], there has been substantial debate about how much animal ex-
perimentation is appropriate, what restrictions should be placed upon it, and whether it
benefits humans at all. See, e.g., ANIMAL EXPERIMENTATION: THE CONSENSUS CHANGES (Gill
Langley ed., 1989) (furnishing a collection of essays about animal experimentation); F. BAR-
BARA ORLANS, IN THE NAME OF SCIENCE: ISSUES IN RESPONSIBLE ANIMAL EXPERIMENTATION
(1993) (recommending increased protection for animals used in experiments); ANDREW N.
ROWAN, OF MICE, MODELS AND MEN: A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF ANIMAL RESEARCH (1984)
(delivering a scientist's evaluation of animal research and asserting that restrictions are ap-
propriate); HANS RUESCH, SLAUGHTER OF THE INNOCENT (1978) (providing an exposb of vivi-
section); RICHARD D. RYDER, VICTIMS OF SCIENCE (1983) (giving an account of the use of
animals in experiments); KENNETH SHAPIRO, A RODENT FOR YOUR THOUGHTS (1993) (critiqu-
ing animal-based psychological research); ROBERT SHARPE, THE CRUEL DECEPTION: THE USE
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other companion animals die each year in pounds and shelters.9
Approximately two hundred million animals are killed per year by
hunters.10 Still more animals spend their lives engaging in unnatu-
ral acts to entertain humans at rodeos, dog and horse races, cir-
cuses, zoos, cockfights, bullfights, and other arenas.
As these figures demonstrate, animals are commonly manipu-
lated to satisfy humans' perceived needs and desires. Despite this
widespread use of animals, many people argue that humans have a
direct duty to treat nonhumans with compassion and respect.1"
OF ANIMALS IN MEDICAL RESEARCH (1988) [hereinafter SHARPE, THE CRUEL DECEPTION] (ar-
guing that vivisection provides negligible benefits to human health); ROBERT SHARPE, SCI-
ENCE ON TRIAL: THE HUMAN COST OF ANIMAL EXPERIMENTS (1994) [hereinafter SHARPE, SCI-
ENCE ON TRIAL] (documenting failures and misleading results of animal research); SINGER,
ANIMAL LIBERATION, supra note 6, at 25-94 (asserting that ethical considerations mandate an
end to animal experimentation); Richard D. Ryder, Speciesism in the Laboratory, in IN
DEFENSE OF ANIMALS 77 (discussing the numbers of animals used in research, the nature of
pain inflicted upon nonhumans, and humane alternatives to animal experimentation); Bert
P. Krages 11, Comment, Rats in the Courtroom: The Admissibility of Animal Studies in
Toxic Tort Cases, 2 J. ENVTL. L. & LrrIG. 229 (1987) (arguing that animal studies should not
be admissible for the purpose of proving causation in toxic tort cases because they provide
generally inaccurate measurements of human risk); Joel Brinkley, Many Say Lab-Animal
Tests Fail to Measure Human Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1993, at Al (reporting that
animal tests may be of little value when attempting to assess the effects of common environ-
mental and household chemicals on humans); Fewer Test Animals Could Mean Safer
Drugs, ECONOMIST, Feb. 5, 1983, at 81 (stating there is "growing evidence that animal tests
are often ambiguous and sometimes downright misleading").
9. ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, THE ANIMALS' ADVOCATE: INVESTIGATING ANIMAL
ABUSE 1 (1987) [hereinafter ALDF, ANIMALS' ADVOCATE].
10. Aileen M. Ugalde, Comment, The Right to Arm Bears: Activists' Protests Against
Hunting, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1109, 1113 (1991).
11. See generally TOM REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 195-329 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter REGAN, CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS]; SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION, supra note 6.
Historically, many scholars and philosophers have argued that humans have an indirect
duty to protect animals. See generally REGAN, CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra at 150-94
(providing a critique of indirect duty views towards animals). For instance, Immanuel Kant
condemned cruelty towards animals because he believed persons who engaged in such be-
havior were likely to extend this violence to their interactions with humans. Immanuel
Kant, Duties to Animals, in ANIMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN OBLIGATIONS 122-23 (Tom Regan &
Peter Singer eds., 1976); see also Alan R. Felthous & Stephen R. Kellert, Violence Against
Animals & People: Is Aggression Against Living Creatures Generalized?, 14 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 55 (1986) (studying possible links between childhood aggression
against nonhumans and subsequent violence against humans); Dr. Randall Lockwood & Guy
R. Hodge, The Tangled Web of Animal Abuse: The Links Between Cruelty to Animals and
Human Violence, HUMANE Soc'Y NEWS (Humane Soc'y of the" U.S., Wash., D.C.), Summer
1986, at 2.
An indirect duty theory was also supported by Saint Thomas Aquinas. He argued that
it is wrong to hurt an animal because such actions will harm the people who own or gain
enjoyment from the animal. Saint Thomas Aquinas, On Killing Living Things and the Duty
to Love Irrational Creatures, in ANIMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN OBLIGATIONS 119 (providing
excerpts of Aquinas' teachings).
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These people claim that animals are not merely objects, resources,
or means to human ends. Rather, they believe that animals have
intrinsic worth.
B. Animal Welfare & Animal Rights
Stemming from a regard for animals and concerns about cru-
elty, the animal welfare movement arose in early nineteenth-cen-
tury England.12 Continuing even today, this movement does not
challenge the fundamental assumption that animals may be used
for human benefit. Instead, the animal welfare movement cam-
paigns for better treatment of animals used by humans. The wel-
fare movement maintains that humans have a duty to avoid un-
necessary cruelty by treating animals humanely. Thus, animal
welfarists may accept many of the current uses of animals while
simultaneously seeking to minimize animal pain.13
In contrast to notions of animal welfare, the animal rights
movement arose in the 1970s with the publication of such works as
Peter Singer's Animal Liberation.4 Advocates of animal rights
challenge the practice of speciesism - discriminating on the
grounds of species membership alone.'5 Animal rights advocates
assert that moral and ethical concerns should not be arbitrarily
limited to humans.' Rather, they contend that certain rights
should be extended to nonhuman species as well.' 7
12. LAWRENCE FINSEN & SUSAN FINSEN, THE ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN AMERICA:
FROM COMPASSION TO RESPECT 24-25 (1994).
13. JAMEs M. JASPER & DOROTHY NELKIN, THE ANIMAL RIGHTS CRUSADE: THE GROWTH
OF A MORAL PROTEST 8 (1992).
14. PETER SINGER, ANIM LIBERATION: A NEW ETHICS FOR OUR TREATMENT OF ANIMALS
(1975). For a discussion of the development of the animal protection movement in Great
Britain and the United States, see FINSEN & FINSEN, supra note 12, at 23-71; ROBERT GAR-
NER, ANIMALS, POLITICS AND MORALITY 38-72 (1993); RICHARD D. RYDER, ANIMAL REVOLU-
TION: CHANGING ATrITUDES TOWARDS SPECIESISM (1989).
15. The term speciesism was coined by Richard Ryder in 1971. FINSEN & FINSEN, supra
note 12, at 55. Peter Singer defines speciesism as "a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of
the interests of members of one's own species and against those of members of other spe-
cies." SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION, supra note 6, at 6. According to Singer, speciesism is akin
to bias based on sex or race (i.e., sexism and racism). Id. at 1-8.
16. An exhaustive analysis of animal rights philosophy is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment. For a sampling of animal rights theory, see ANIMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN OBLIGATIONS
(Tom Regan & Peter Singer eds., 1976); ANIMALS, MEN AND MORALS (Stanley Godlovitch et.
al. eds., 1972); MARY MIDGLEY, ANIMALS AND WHY THEY MATTER (1983); REGAN, CASE FOR
ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 11; BERNARD E. ROLLIN, ANIMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN MORALITY
(1981); HENRY SALT, ANIMALS' RIGHTS CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO SOCIAL PROGRESS (1980);
SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION, supra note 6.
17. Animal rights theorists may disagree as to which animals should be endowed with
rights. While some proponents would extend rights to great apes or all mammals, others
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Animal rights philosophy sets forth that nonhumans are enti-
tled to equal consideration because there is no meaningful charac-
teristic possessed by humans that is not also possessed by animals.
Advocates point to an ever growing body of literature indicating
that animals are sentient,18 capable of feeling pleasure19 and pain,20
and aware of their own existence.2 1 Therefore, they argue that
humans must recognize some basic rights of animals, such as the
right to live according to their nature and the right to be free from
exploitation.2 2
would also recognize the rights of insects and fish. Though theorists may differ regarding
which nonhuman species should be identified rights holders, all advocates agree that human
beings should not constitute the sole species with rights. See, e.g., REGAN, CASE FOR ANIMAL
RIGHTS, supra note 11 (arguing that animals satisfying subject of life criteria are entitled to
rights); Anthony D'Amato & Sudhir K. Chopra, Whales: Their Emerging Right to Life, 85
AM. J. INT'L L. 21 (1991) (arguing that rights should be extended to whales); A Declaration
of Great Apes, in THE GREAT APE PRoJEcT: EQUALITY BEYOND HUMANITY 4 (Paola Cavalieri
& Peter Singer eds., 1993) (advancing that great apes should have rights recognized by
humans); Roger W. Galvin, What Rights for Animals? A Modest Proposal, 2 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 245 (1985) (proposing that rights be extended to nonhuman animals); Joyce S. Tis-
chler, Comment, Rights for Nonhuman Animals: A Guardianship Model for Cats ard Dogs,
14 SAN DINGO L. REv. 484 (1977) (submitting that cats and dogs be endowed with legal
rights).
18. Seventeenth-century philosopher Rene Descartes proposed that animals were mere
automata or machines. Descartes argued that animals did not think and were not aware of
sights, sounds, tastes, hunger, fear, rage, pleasure, pain, etc. Rene Descartes, Animals Are
Machines, in ANIMAL RIGHTS AND Huhim OBLIGATIONS 60 (Tom Regan & Peter Singer eds.,
1976). These beliefs are now widely challenged. For a discussion of sentience and a critique
of Descartes, see GARNER, supra note 14, at 11-21; REGAN, CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra
note 11, at 3-33; SINGER, ANIMAL LIERATION, supra note 6, at 10-17; Voltaire, A Reply to
Descartes, in ANMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN OBLIGATIONS 67 (Tom Regan & Peter Singer eds.,
1976).
19. See, e.g., Stuart L. Brown, Animals at Play, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Dec. 1994, at 2.
20. E.g., MARIAN S. DAWKINS, ANImAL SUFFERING: THE SCIENCE OF ANIMAL WELFARE
(1980); Marian S. Dawkins, The Scientific Basis for Assessing Suffering in Animals, in IN
DEFENSE OF ANIMALS 27 (Peter Singer ed., 1985). See also SINGER, ANMAL LIBERATION, supra
note 6, at 10-17.
21. DONALD R. GRIFFIN, AImAL MINDS 249 (1992) (discussing self-awareness in grizzly
bears); CARL SAGAN & ANN DRUYAN, SHADOWS OF FORGOTTEN ANCESTORS: A SEARCH FOR WHO
WE ARE 378-79 (1992) (addressing self-awareness in chimpanzees, orangutans, and
dolphins).
22. The authors of The Great Ape Project argue that the following principles or rights
should govern human relations with great apes: (1) the right to life, (2) the protection of
individual liberty, and (3) the prohibition of torture. A Declaration of Great Apes, supra
note 17, at 4. Roger Galvin, author of What Rights for Animals? A Modest Proposal, sets
forth a slightly different declaration of rights for animals: "(1) All animals have a right to
live out their lives according to and in harmony with their nature, instincts, and intelligence.
... (2) All animals have a right to live in a habitat ecologically sufficient for normal exis-
tence.... (3) All animals have a right to be free from exploitation." Galvin, supra note 17,
at 253; see also ROLLIN, supra note 16, at 83 (arguing that animals should be given "the
right to life, the right to be protected from suffering, and the right to live life according to
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Opponents of animal rights often attempt to identify attrib-
utes possessed solely by humans that allegedly provide justification
for homo sapiens' exclusive possession of rights holder status. In
Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors, Carl Sagan and Ann Druyan ex-
plain this phenomenon:
A sharp distinction is necessary between humans and "animals" if we are to
bend them to our will, make them work for us, wear them, eat them -
without any disquieting tinges of guilt or regret. With untroubled con-
sciences, we can render whole species extinct - for our perceived short-
term benefit, or even through simple carelessness. Their loss is of little im-
port: Those beings, we tell ourselves, are not like us.2 3
Despite the opposition's efforts, there is an increasing body of
literature blurring the distinctions between humans and other ani-
mals, whether one looks to genetic differences, 24 language capabili-
ties,25 morality,26 intelligence, 27 the ability to make and use tools,28
their nature").
It is commonly believed that advocates of animal rights would like nonhumans to be
endowed with all of those rights enjoyed by humans (e.g., voting, free speech). This belief is
patently in error. Animal rights proponents argue that nonhumans should only be given
rights that are meaningful to their unique species. As explained by Bernard Rollin, "the
rights of animals should not be the rights of adult human beings, but neither are the rights
of children and corporations." ROLLIN, supra note 16, at 86.
23. SAGAN & DRUYAN, supra note 21, at 365. Similarly, Charles Darwin commented:
"Animals, whom we have made our slaves, we do not like to consider our equal." MARJORiE
SPIEGEL, THE DREADED COMPARISON: HUMAN AND ANIMAL SLAVERY 96 (2d ed. 1988).
24. Genetically, humans are closely related to other animals. Human DNA differs from
chimpanzee DNA by a mere 1.6 to 1.7 percent. Since much of human DNA is thought to be
dormant, or junk, active human and chimp DNA differ by only 0.4%. Furthermore, humans
are more closely related to chimpanzees than chimpanzees are to gorillas. In contrast, the
difference in DNA between red-eyed and white-eyed vireos (a type of bird) is 2.9%. JARED
DIAMOND, THE THIRD CHIiPANZEE: THE EVOLUTION AND FUTURE OF THE HuMAN ANIMAL 20-
23 (1992); SAGAN & DRUYAN, supra note 21, at 276-78. Thus, based on genetic differences
alone, it seems illogical to set humans apart as rights holders while grouping all other ani-
mals together as rightless beings.
25. For discussion of nonhumans' language capabilities, see DIAMOND, supra note 24, at
143, 146-47, 151, 213-16 (reviewing language abilities of vervet monkeys, gorillas, chimpan-
zees and dolphins); THE GREAT APE PROJECT: EQUALrrY BEYOND HUMANITY 28-76 (Paola
Cavalieri & Peter Singer eds., 1993) (providing evidence of language in chimpanzees, orang-
utans, and gorillas); SAGAN & DRUYAN, supra note 21, at 352-58, 380-83 (examining language
in chimps); D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 17, at 21 (addressing language abilities of whales
and dolphins); Galvin, supra note 17, at 251 nn.23-29 (citing scientific research which iden-
tifies the communicative capabilities of honeybees, ants, canids, monkeys, dolphins, gorillas,
and chimpanzees); Tischler, supra note 17, at 494-96 nn.79-94 (mentioning studies which
indicate that dogs, wolves, chimpanzees, and whales have communicative skills).
26. There is much evidence to indicate that many animals are ethical beings. See, e.g.,
GRIFFIN, supra note 21, at 214 (describing kindness in dolphins); ROBBINS, supra note 6, at
21-22, 24-33 (providing anecdotal evidence about animals' kindness to humans and other
animals). Consider the following illustration:
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or possession of a soul. 29 Thus, numerous studies persuasively
demonstrate that at least some animals possess each of these alleg-
edly unique human qualities.
In addition to proving that many animals are higher function-
ing, animal rights advocates may assert that such qualities are not
truly determinative of who constitutes a rights holder in modern
society. Infants, some persons who are profoundly mentally chal-
lenged, and persons who are senile may not have the capacity to
use tools, language, or exhibit a high intellect; yet, they are still
rights holders.30 In sum, animal rights advocates argue that the
claimed differences between humans and nonhumans are differ-
ences in degree rather than kind. They assert that there is no
sound basis for completely excluding animals as rights holders.
In a laboratory setting, macaques were fed if they were willing to pull a chain and
electrically shock an unrelated macaque whose agony was in plain view through a
one-way mirror. Otherwise, they starved. After learning the ropes, the monkeys
frequently refused to pull the chain; in one experiment only 13% would do so -
87% preferred to go hungry. One macaque went without food for nearly two weeks
rather than hurt its fellow. Macaques who had themselves been shocked in previ-
ous experiments were even less willing to pull the chain.
SAGAN & DRUYAN, supra note 21, at 117 (citation omitted).
27. There is much evidence indicating that many species of animals have the ability to
reason. GRIFFIN, supra note 21; ROBBINS, supra note 6, at 40-44 (providing anecdotal evi-
dence of intelligence in dogs, cats, and elephants); SAGAN & DRUYAN, supra note 21, at 390-
99 (addressing the intelligence of flatworms and other animals); Tischler, supra note 17, at
492 nn.63-66 (mentioning writings which indicate animals can reason).
In fact, there are grounds to believe that in some areas, human intelligence may be
matched or exceeded by that of other species. See, e.g., D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 17,
at 21 nn.2-3, 6 (citing studies which indicate whales and dolphins are highly intelligent be-
'ings); Kenneth S. Norris, Dolphins in Crisis, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Sept. 1992, at 5, 11-13
("Their [dolphins] memory capacity matches our own; they can follow remarkably compli-
cated directions - through both visual and auditory commands .... And they remember
strings of random numbers as well as or better than we do.").
28. Numerous studies indicate that some nonhuman animal species make and use tools.
See, e.g., SAGAN & DRUYAN, supra note 21, at 282, 391-98; Galvin, supra note 17, at 250
nn.20-21.
29. Some humans who dispute rights for animals argue that nonhumans do not have
souls and this quality sets humans apart from all other beings. Because it is difficult to
provide scientific proof that (1) persons have souls, and (2) animals do not, this appears to
be a precarious argument on which to contest the rights of animals. However, this issue has
been addressed by various authors. See ANDR w LINZMEY, ANIMAL RIGHTS: A CHRISTIAN As-
SESSMENT OF MAN'S TREATMENT OF ANIMALs (1976); ROLLIN, supra note 16, at 6-7.
30. See GARNER, supra note 14, at 14-16; SINGER, ANiMAL LIBERATION, supra note 6, at
15-16. This argument is commonly referred to as the argument from marginal cases. GAR-
NER, supra note 14, at 14-16.
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C. Animal Protection Tactics
Advocates for animals use various techniques to elicit protec-
tion for nonhumans. Animal welfarists attempt to educate the pub-
lic about animal abuse. They also lobby for protective legislations'
to ensure that certain identified cruelties are not inflicted upon an-
imals. For example, an animal welfare agenda would possibly seek
larger cages for laboratory animals or support farmers' efforts to
raise free-range rather than battery-caged hens.2
While animal rights organizations may also participate in and
support these welfare efforts," the ultimate goal of the rights pro-
ponent is to eliminate human use of animals. Due to their philo-
sophical beliefs, rights proponents would not be completely ap-
peased by the reduction of abuse in animal facilities. Rights
advocates believe that typical animal use is abuse; therefore, they
seek abolition rather than mere reform. Though animal rights ac-
tivists would not object to better treatment for animals, they
would never be entirely appeased by welfare doctrine.
Proponents of animal rights use various legal means to pursue
their agenda. They attempt to protect animals via lawsuits, politi-
cal protest, and economic campaigns.34 Their efforts often include
aggressive, yet peaceful techniques, such as civil disobedience, boy-
cotts, picketing, and demonstrations.31
By the early 1980s, however, the United States' animal rights
movement developed a fringe element whose members identified
31. JASPER & NELKIN, supra note 13, at 8.
32. As a cost savings device, laying hens owned by large egg producers are typically
raised in battery cages. In the animal protection community, these cages are infamous for
their cruelty. Battery hens are debeaked because the intensive confinement causes them to
peck each other. They are confined in stacked, wire-mesh cages that are suspended over a
trench to collect droppings. Though cage sizes vary, four or five birds are typically crowded
into a cage with a 12 by 20 inch floor area. This overcrowding often leads to bruised,
stressed, and sick birds. See generally SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION, supra note 6, at 107-19;
Mason, Brave New Farm?, supra note 6, at 90-93, 95-98. Free-range laying hens are those
not raised in battery cages.
33. A few rights activists discourage animal protectors from investing significant effort
on a welfare agenda. These rights advocates assert that welfare efforts provide little benefit
to animals and instead mislead the public into believing that animals used by industry are
treated humanely. Other rights activists participate in welfare actions because they believe
these efforts will curtail injuries currently inflicted upon animals and make animal use a
more costly endeavor; however, these rights advocates still ultimately support the elimina-
tion of all animal use. See Tom Regan & Gary Francione, A Movement's Means Create Its
Ends, ANIMALS' AGENDA, Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 40.
34. JASPER & NELKIN, supra note 13, at 9.
35. RIK SCARCE, ECO-WARRIORS: UNDERSTANDING THE RADICAL ENVIRONMENTAL MOVE-
himNT 68-74, 116 (1990).
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themselves as animal liberators.36 In contrast to their self-naming,
animal liberators have been labeled animal rights terrorists or ex-
tremists by the FBI and others not sympathetic to the activists'
goals.3 7 These animal liberators are a small but vocal contingent of
the current animal protection movement.
Frustrated by what they perceive to be an insufficient pace of
change in ending animal oppression, and likening themselves to
the conductors of the Underground Railroad s used to free human
slaves,3s liberators protect nonhumans by engaging in direct ac-
tion ° against animal enterprises. This direct action includes crimi-
nal, clandestine tactics such as vandalism, property destruction,
and animal theft. Unlike those who engage in routine civil disobe-
dience, liberators act covertly and attempt to evade arrest. The re-
maining portion of this Comment will review the efforts of these
animal liberators and the resulting backlash.
36. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE EXTENT
AND EFFECTS OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM ON ANIMAL ENTERPRISES 4-5 (Oct.
1993) [hereinafter JUSTICE REPORT]. There is also a vigorous animal liberation movement in
Britain. For a detailed, albeit disparaging, history of its activities, see DAVID HENSHAW,
ANIMAL WARFARE (1989).
37. Animal Research Facility Protection: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Dep't Operations, Research, and Foreign Agric. and the Subcomm. on Livestock, Dairy,
and Poultry of the House Comm. on Agric., 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (Feb. 28, 1990) [herein-
after Animal Research Hearings]; JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 36, at 2; LORENZ 0.
LUTHERER & MARGARET S. SIMON, TARGETED: THE ANATOMY OF AN ANIMAL RIGHTS ATTACK 9
(1992); KATHLEEN MARQUARDT ET AL., ANIMALSCAM: THE BEASTLY ABUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
187 n.1 (1993) (citing OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, 102D CONG., 2D SESS., TECHNOL-
OGY AGAINST TERRORISM: STRUCTURING SECURITY 26 (1992)); AMA White Paper, supra note
8, at 7-9.
38. FINSEN & FINSEN, supra note 12, at 276; KATHY SNOW GUILLERMO, MONKEY BUSI-
NESS: THE DISTURBING CASE THAT LAUNCHED THE ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 70 (1993); IN-
GRID NEWKIRK, FREE THE ANIMALS!: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE U.S. ANIMAL LIBERATION
FRONT & ITS FOUNDER, "VALERIE" 154-55, 245-46 (1992); Carla McClain, Lab Violence: ALF
Tells Why, TUCSON CITIZEN, May 4, 1989, at 1A, 4A, reprinted in Animal Research Hear-
ings, supra note 37; Members of a Militant Animal Rights Group Broke Into a Barn at a
Rabbitry, UPI, March 27, 1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWS File, WIRES
Subfile. Other types of activists have compared their efforts to that of the abolitionists and
the Underground Railroad. See, e.g., Kathleen L. Villarruel, Note, The Underground Rail-
road and the Sanctuary Movement: A Comparison of History, Litigation, and Values, 60 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1429 (1987) (comparing the Underground Railroad to the modem sanctuary
movement that aids Central Americans fleeing their countries).
39. A variety of authors have compared the plight of enslaved humans and nonhumans.
See, e.g., DAVID S. FAVRE & MURRAY LORING, ANIMAL LAW 2 (1983); SPIEGEL, supra note 23;
Geza Teleki, They Are Us, in THE GREAT APE PROJECT: EQUALITY BEYOND HUMANITY 296
(Paola Cavalieri & Peter Singer eds., 1993).
40. An Animal Liberation Primernu ed., 3d ed.) (People for Animal Liberation, Santa
Cruz, Cal.) (unpublished booklet) [hereinafter ALF Primer].
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II. ANIMAL LIBERATORS
I and my daughters and husband have been regarded as almost fanatical in
our care of animals .... Last year we exerted ourselves to get a law passed
protecting the birds of Florida which were being trapped and carried off by
thousands to die in miserable little cages ... veritable slave ships .... I for
my part am ready to do anything that can benefit the cause."1
- Harriet Beecher Stowe
A. Who Are the Animal Liberators?
In the United States, approximately sixteen different groups
have claimed responsibility for animal liberation actions.4 '2 The
most infamous and active of all these organizations is the Animal
Liberation Front (ALF).43
Animal liberation entities such as the ALF appear to be amor-
phous in structure and have no prescribed membership criteria.44
The 1993 report by the U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture entitled Extent and Effects of Domestic
and International Terrorism on Animal Enterprises (hereinafter
Justice Report) explains:
Whether ALF ... can be characterized as an organization, per se, or as an
"umbrella" ideology or cause, is an issue still being debated. Regardless of
how it may be characterized as a whole, it is widely believed that ALF is a
41. SPIEGEL, supra note 23, at 95 (quoting letter from Harriet Beecher Stowe, author of
UNCLE ToM's CABIN, to Henry Bergh, founder of the American Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA) (Nov. 6, 1877)).
42. JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 36, at 30. These groups include Animal Avengers,
Animal Liberation Action Foundation, Animal Liberation Front (ALF), Animals Now,
Animal Rights Militia (ARM), Band of Mercy (BOM), Earth First! (EF!), Earth Night Ac-
tion Group, Farm Freedom Fighters, Guardian Apes, Paint Panthers, Socialist Committee
for the Protection of Animals (SCPA), True Friends, Undersea Railroad, Urban Gorillas,
and the Western Wildlife Unit/Cell (of the Animal Liberation Front). Id.
The Department of Justice has also designated EF! as an animal liberation entity. EFI,
an environmental advocacy group that disbanded in the early 1990s, worked to keep mining,
logging, grazing, and other development out of United States wildlands. Animal rights and
environmental groups unite on some issues having a direct relation to animals and the envi-
ronment. For instance, issues of habitat preservation impact both the environment and the
animals within it and would likely garner the support of both movements. On some issues
regarding animal rights, however, EF! and animal liberators may diverge. For example, some
members of EF! eat meat and hunt animals. These traits are likely to conflict with the
beliefs of someone who strictly adheres to animal rights doctrine. GARNER, supra note 14, at
63; CHRISTOPHER MANES, GREEN RAGE: RADICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM AND THE UNMAKING OF
CIVILIZATION 8, 198 (1990); SCARCE, supra note 35, at 117, 130-31.
43. JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 36, at 5.
44. Id. at 6; ALF Primer, supra note 40; SCARCE, supra note 35, at 135-36, 213-23.
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loose configuration of small, autonomous "cells," with no centralized com-
mand structure. It is also believed that there are no formal membership
requirements beyond the willingness to inflict damage upon an animal
enterprise.
45
An animal liberator active with the Animal Liberation Front clari-
fies: "We are not members of the ALF, in fact the ALF has not one
single member. We are ALF activists by virtue of the fact that we
carry out actions, whether on an occasional or frequent basis. '46
The exact number of persons in the ALF is unknown. Esti-
mates suggest that approximately 100 persons conduct direct ac-
tion tactics on behalf of the ALF in the United States.4 Ronald
Lee, co-founder of the ALF in Britain,48 estimates that there are
approximately 500 to 1,000 persons active in the ALF worldwide. 49
Law enforcement efforts to profile animal liberators appear to
yield few results.50 Regarding the United States, it has been
claimed that animal liberators on the East Coast tend to be well-
paid professionals who generally restrict their activities to liberat-
ing animals from research laboratories. In contrast, West Coast
animal liberators are believed to be anarchists, have only moderate
education, and tend to hold menial jobs or work part-time so they
45. JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 36, at 6.
46. ALF Primer, supra, note 40; see also, RYDER, ANimAL REVOLUTION, supra note 14, at
274. Ryder described the British ALF in the following manner:
[T]he ALF is not the highly organized and centrally controlled organization that
some people have claimed, nor is it funded lavishly by sinister or other sources,
but quite meagrely and by very ordinary British people. It is, most probably, a
collection of individuals acting independently, driven by a sense of outrage and
compassion, with no ulterior or party political motive and no particular flair for
organization.
Id.
47. JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 36, at 6; 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AssOcIATIONS pt. 2, sec. 7,
at 1407 (30th ed. 1996); see also Marla Williams, Saving Animals Through Violence: Shad-
owy ALF Leaves Costly Trail of Destruction, SEATTLE TIMES, June 18, 1991, at Al, A8
("Law-enforcement officials and fur-industry authorities estimate that fewer than 500 peo-
ple nationwide participate in ALF actions.").
48. The Animal Liberation Front was started in 1972 by activists Ronald Lee and Clif-
ford Goodman. The group was initially called the Band of Mercy but was renamed the
Animal Liberation Front in 1976. For a history of the British ALF, see RYDER, ANIMAL
REVOLUTION, supra note 14, at 273-99.
49. Philip Windeatt, 'They Clearly Now See the Link: Militant Voices, in IN DEFENSE
OF ANIMALS 179, 191 (Peter Singer ed., 1985). ALF activities have been identified in Britain,
Australia, New Zealand, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Poland, Sweden, South Africa, Ca-
nada, and the Netherlands. GARNER, supra note 14, at 218; RYDER, ANIMAL REVOLUTION,
supra note 14, at 288; ScARcE, supra note 35, at 140.
50. George G. McClellan, The Terrorists Among Us: Animal Rights Terrorism, SEcUR-
rrY MGMT., July 1993, at 33, 36.
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may devote more energy to their cause.51 For the most part, how-
ever, animal liberators are believed to be employed in a variety of
occupations and to have no prior criminal record. 52
B. Liberators' Mission and Methods
According to the ALF, the mission of animal liberators is
threefold:
(1) To liberate animals from places of abuse ... and place them in good
homes where they can live out their natural lives free from suffering; (2) to
inflict economic damage [upon] those who profit from the misery and ex-
ploitation of animals; and, (3) to reveal the horror and atrocities committed
against animals behind locked doors by performing non-violent direct ac-
tions and liberations."3
Thus, the liberators' agenda includes saving individual animals, in-
forming the public about violence inflicted on nonhumans by
animal enterprises, and making animal exploitation a less lucrative
business in which to engage. 4 Unlike other animal protectors,
animal liberators have gone underground to achieve their three-
part agenda of liberation, education, and economic sabotage.
The ALF and other animal liberation groups engage in direct
action, i.e., clandestine, illegal activity to protect animals and fur-
ther the liberators' agenda for change. In the United States, the
types of crimes committed by animal liberators have varied
widely.5 5 Liberation actions have ranged from vandalism, to release
51. SCARCE, supra note 35, at 135.
52. McClellan, supra note 50, at 34; see also RYDER, ANIMAL REVOLUTION, supra note
14, at 278-79. One account of the British ALF states:
[Oif the 'up to 2000' ALF activists about half are working class and half middle
class: 'with a strong presence of lawyers, teachers and civil servants. Unlike many
other fringe or outlaw groups, the majority of ALF members currently at large
have secure jobs'. . . . None appear to enjoy breaking the law and most are re-
ported to dread going to prison.
Id.
53. ALF Primer, supra note 40.
54. The ALF justifies economic sabotage as follows:
It is valid to destroy any property that is used to harm animals, to harm any being
that feels pain and fear. By vandalizing the labs, you make it more difficult for
research to continue. You also make it more expensive to do it .... [I]n a way, it
is much the same thing as the abolitionists who fought against slavery going in
and burning down the slave quarters or tearing down the auction block or the
whipping post - whatever is used to subjugate the slaves.
McClain, supra note 38, at 139.
55. For a record of animal liberation activities in the United States, see JusTIcE RE-
PORT, supra note 36, at 12-16; MARQUARDT, supra note 37, at 161-64; People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals, History of American Animal Liberation Actions (Apr. 24, 1993)
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of animals, to a lone murder attempt." The Department of Justice
estimates that over half of all direct action consists of petty van-
dalism and minor property damage.57 Another twenty-five percent
of animal liberation activities involves the theft, or liberation, of
animals.58 The remaining incidents of direct action consist of more
serious crimes such as major property damage, arson, and bomb
threats.59
Animal liberators' direct action has targeted a broad range of
[hereinafter PETA, History of Liberation] (factsheet on file with PETA, Wash., D.C.).
56. JUSTiCE REPORT, supra note 36, at 15-16. On November 11, 1988, Fran Stephanie
Trutt, a substitute teacher from Queens, New York, planted a pipe bomb outside the head-
quarters of United States Surgical Corporation. She allegedly intended to harm the com-
pany's President and Chief Executive Officer, Leon Hirsch. Trutt pleaded nolo contendere
in Connecticut Superior Court to charges of attempted murder, possession of explosives, and
manufacturing a bomb. As part of Trutt's plea agreement, provisions were allegedly made so
she could visit her dogs while serving her sentence. In a federal court in New York, Trutt
also pleaded guilty to federal charges that she had two bombs in her apartment. Id. at 24, 27
n.27; Marvine Howe, Advocate for Animal Rights Pleads Guilty in Bomb Case, N.Y. TIMEs,
July 15, 1989, at 29; Pipe-Bomb Suspect Offers No-Contest Plea: Animal Activist Trutt
Charged in Murder Attempt, NEWSDAY, Apr. 17, 1990, at 4; A Serious Case of Puppy Love:
Violence Becomes an Issue in an Animal-Rights Protest, TIrmE, Nov. 28, 1988, at 24 [herein-
after Puppy Love]; Monte R. Young, Animal Rights Activist Sentenced, NEWSDAY, July 17,
1990, at 28; Monte R. Young, Trutt Sees Her Dogs: Says Visits Part of Bomb Case Plea-
Bargain, NEWSDAY, July 20, 1990, at 36.
Trutt was allegedly aided by two accomplices who were employees of Perceptions Inter-
national, "a surveillance organization that monitors and infiltrates animal rights groups."
JASPER & NELKIN, supra note 13, at 50. Perceptions International had been hired by U.S.
Surgical. Newspaper reports stated that the accomplices may have befriended Trutt, sug-
gested killing Hirsch, paid for the bomb, talked Trutt out of her misgivings, and provided
transport to the parking lot where she attempted to plant the bomb. FINSEN & FINSEN,
supra note 12, at 174; JASPER & NELKIN, supra note 13, at 50; Animal-Rights Case: Terror
or Entrapment?, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 3, 1989, at Bi; Bomb Suspect's Driver Says He Was
Informer, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 13, 1989, at B2; Robert E. Kessler & Michael Slackman, Tipster
Drove Suspect in Attempted Bombing, NEWSDAY, Jan. 12, 1989, at 2; Nick Ravo, U.S. Sur-
gical Admits Spying on Animal-Rights. Groups, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 26, 1989, at B1; but see
Leon C. Hirsch, No Company Money for Bombs in Animal Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1989,
at 26 (letter to the editor).
Trutt targeted U.S. Surgical because it uses hundreds of live dogs each year to train
doctors and the company's salespersons in the use of the surgical staplers it manufactures.
Trainees learn the stapling technique by practicing on anesthetized dogs who are subse-
quently killed. U.S. Surgical's President insists there is no substitute for live animals in the
training program. He claims, "A dead dog doesn't bleed.... You need to have real blood-
flow conditions, or you get a false sense of security." Puppy Love, supra, at 24. Nonetheless,
activists assert that "many surgeons learn stapling without practicing on live animals." Id.
57. JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 36, at 15.
58. Id.
59. The following data indicates the most common activities perpetrated by animal lib-
erators: vandalism/minor property damage, 51%; theft/release of animals, 25%; personal
threats, 9%; major property damage, 8%; arson, 7%; bomb threats, 5%; firebombing, 4%;
hoax bombing, 3%. Id. at 9-12.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
animal users. These animal enterprises have included university
and private research laboratories, department stores that sell
clothing made from animals, fur retailers, meat retailers, and food
producers. Occasionally, individuals profiting from animal use have
also been the subject of direct action.60
Liberators try to avoid arrest for direct action activities. Many
animal liberation incidents, therefore, occur "at night after consid-
erable pre-incident surveillance and planning. 6 1 One commentator
estimates that there has been staff sympathy or infiltration in
more than ninety percent of the cases involving damage to animal
laboratories.62
In total, the Department of Justice estimates that from 1977
to 1993, approximately 313 incidents of direct action occurred in
the United States." The Justice Report explains, however, that
this data was derived primarily from news media reports6 4 and
cautions that "it is generally believed that many animal rights-re-
lated incidents - especially those involving relatively minor acts
of vandalism such as graffiti - go unreported, and therefore are
numerically underestimated in [the Department of Justice] analy-
sis. '"65 Accurate figures on the frequency of animal liberation activ-
ity may also be difficult to obtain because animal liberators do not
always take credit for their actions.6 In addition, there have been
assertions from within the animal protection movement that some
of the more violent activities attributed to animal liberators are
actually the work of agent provocateurs67 rather than animal
activists.6 8
60. The following data indicate the frequency with which particular types of animal
enterprises have been the target of illegal actions: university facilities (medical and re-
search), 20.1%; fur retailers, 15.3%; individuals, 13.7%; meat retailers, 10.5%; food produc-
tion, 8.9%; private research, 6.7%; department stores, 3.8%; federal research, 2.6%; other,
18.2%. Id.
61. Edward L. Lee, II, Violent Avengers, SECURITY MGMT., Dec. 1989, at 38, 42; see,
e.g., SCARCE, supra note 35, at 219 (describing surveillance conducted by liberators before
breaking into a Loma Linda University laboratory).
62. Lee, supra note 61, at 42; see FINSEN & FINSEN, supra note 12, at 103; see, e.g.,
SCARCE, supra note 35, at 214-16 (describing an incident of direct action in which a univer-
sity laboratory contact provided assistance to the liberators).
63. JUSTICE REPoRT, supra note 36, at 8.
64. Id. at 8 n.6.
65. Id. at 8 n.7.
66. JASPER & NELKIN, supra note 13, at 34.
67. The term agent provocateur refers to persons opposed to animal rights who either
(1) induce animal activists to conduct illegal acts or (2) perform clandestine direct action
themselves so that negative publicity is brought on the animal protection movement. See,
e.g., GARNER, supra note 14, at 219-20.
68. GARNER, supra note 14, at 219-20; Andrew A. Skolnick, Terrorists Strike Again as
U.S. Congress Considers Bills to Outlaw Attacks on Animal Research Centers, 267 JAMA
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C. The Liberator Code: Harm Things, Not People
Animal protectors, animal users, and law enforcement officials
disagree about the character of the illegal tactics used by animal
liberators. Animal enterprises and their sympathizers describe lib-
erators as terrorists or extremists and define their actions as vio-
lent. 9 Liberators, however, disagree with this characterization of
direct action. The official policy of the ALF is nonviolent direct
action.70 Liberators do not view acts that destroy or disrupt animal
enterprises as violent because these acts are committed against in-
animate objects.71 When engaging in direct action, animal libera-
tors in the United States assert that they take extensive precau-
tions to ensure that no person is injured.7 2 Thus, while liberators
appear to be willing to sabotage things, they are reluctant to injure
beings, whether human or nonhuman.73
There has been no conclusive proof that a person has ever
been physically injured by animal liberation activity in the United
States. The Justice Report notes that "none of the extremist
animal rights-related activities analyzed for this report is known to
have resulted in the injury or death of another individual. ' ' 74 None-
theless, the report also states:
In February 1990[,] Dr. Hyram Kitchen, Dean of the Veterinary School of
the University of Tennessee, was shot and killed on his private farm. One
month before the incident, a local police department issued an alert... that
animal rights extremists had threatened to assassinate a veterinary dean
within the following 12 months. No one was ever arrested for the act and
there was no claim of responsibility. Some suspect that ALF or another ex-
tremist animal rights group or individual was responsible. It must be em-
phasized, however, that this suspicion has never been substantiated.75
At least for now, it appears that animal liberators in the United
States have drawn a firm distinction between damaging inanimate
objects and causing physical harm to humans.
It appears, however, that there may be a few dissenting voices
within the liberation movement who would countenance harm to
humans in the name of animal protection. For example, British
Animal Liberation Front leader Tim Daley has reportedly con-
2577 (1992).
69. See, e.g., MARQUARDT, supra note 37, at xii-xiii; McClellan, supra note 50, at 33.
70. JUSTxCE REPORT, supra note 36, at 4; ALF Primer, supra note 40.
71. JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 36, at 4.
72. See SCARCE, supra note 35, at 77, 125, 222.
73. FINSEN & FINSEN, supra note 12, at 102.
74. JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 36, at 16.




In a war you have to take up arms and people will get killed, and I can
support that kind of action by petrol bombing and bombs under cars, and
probably at a later stage, the shooting of vivisectors on their doorsteps. It's
a war, and there's no other way you can stop vivisectors. 7
Likewise, one of the most inflammatory instances in which an al-
leged animal liberator has advocated violence against humans can
be found in A Declaration of War: Killing People to Save Animals
and the Environment, a book written under the pseudonym
Screaming Wolf.71 Claiming that "the idea of nonviolence as an ef-
fective means of gaining freedom for animals is a myth," this book
asserts that "[w]e cannot stop vivisection, but we can stop a vivi-
sector. We cannot end hunting, but we can put an end to some
hunters. We cannot cripple the fur industry, but we can cripple
some trappers. '78 Various animal activists have maintained that
this publication was written by an animal enterprise sympathizer
in an attempt to discredit the animal protection movement. 9
Despite these anomalous instances in which physical harm to-
wards humans has been advocated, many animal activists assert
that animal exploiters are the parties more accurately described as
violent.80 Roger Yates, an imprisoned animal activist in Great Brit-
ain, explains:
In my prison cell I have had time to tot up the figures of animal v. human
deaths in the current hysterical 'the animal rights movement is violent' era.
Since the Animal Liberation Front has been in existence (about ten years)
TENS OF HUNDREDS OF BILLIONS of animals have been massacred by
human kind, yet not ONE person has ever been seriously injured by the
animal rights movement anywhere in the world. On top of that I know of at
least four animal rights campaigners who have received broken bones from
the opposition, including one broken back and two skull fractures, one very
serious case which involved subsequent brain surgery: can anyone state sim-
ilar injuries sustained by an animal exploiter? 81
76. Id. at 1.
77. Andrew A. Skolnick, Anonymously(?) Authored Book Urges Violence, 266 JAMA
2186 (1991) (reviewing SCREAMING WOLF, A DECLARATION OF WAR: KILLING PEOPLE TO SAVE
ANIMALS AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1991)).
78. Id. at 2191.
79. Id.
80. See GARNER, supra note 14, at 220; RYDER, ANIMAL REVOLUTION, supra note 14, at
280-87.
81. RYDER, ANIMAL REVOLUTION, supra note 14, at 282. Opponents of animal liberation
may also argue that animal experimentation is necessary for advances in human health care
and that liberators indirectly threaten human lives by impeding research. These contentions
regarding the supposed benefits of animal research, however, are not without detractors.
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Similarly, alleged American ALF leader Valerie has commented: "I
don't think that destroying a building can be really classified as
violence. I think that burning an animal is violent .... People
burn animals with blowtorches. They immerse guinea pigs in scald-
ing water. They put electrodes into cats' heads."82 Thus, many
animal advocates emphasize that liberators inflict mere economic
damage; their adversaries impose pain and suffering on sentient
beings. While animal users define harm to objects as violence and
terrorism, animal liberators use these terms to describe harm to
beings.
III. JUSTIFYING ILLEGAL TACTICS
One has not only a legal but a moral responsibility to obey just laws. Con-
versely, one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws .... I would
agree with St. Augustine that 'an unjust law is no law at all.' 83
- Martin Luther King, Jr.
Animal liberators contend that lawful means of advocacy, used
alone, cannot rescue many animals in immediate danger. Further,
it appears that legal actions cannot currently end institutionalized
animal oppression due to three fundamental impediments: (1)
animal enterprises wield extraordinary cultural and political power
in the United States; (2) profound deficiencies permeate contem-
porary animal protection legislation; and, (3) activists and animals
typically lack legal standing to litigate specific instances of cruelty.
These barriers all serve to perpetuate or condone animal exploita-
tion and impede activists' abolitionist agenda. 4
Some argue that animal research is repetitive, causes results that can never be conclusively
applied to humans, and diverts funds from health care and more relevant research. See, e.g.,
SHARPE, THE CRUEL DECEPTION, supra note 8; SHARPE, SCIENCE ON TRIAL, supra note 8. Con-
cerns about direct action's detrimental effects on human health may also be minimized be-
cause (1) only about twenty percent of all direct action targets facilities which conduct
animal research, and (2) after experiencing a delay to remedy damage caused by liberators,
targets of direct action almost always resume their projects. JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 36,
at 10-11, 21.
82. Susan Reed & Sue Carswell, Animal Passion: The Animal-Rights Movement's Mili-
tant "Valerie" Emerges From Hiding for an Exclusive People Interview, PEOPLE, Jan. 18,
1993, at 34, 36. Valerie is the alias used by the alleged founder of the American ALF. Id.
See generally NEWKIRK, supra note 38 (providing a fictional account of several ALF raids to
shield the identity of the liberators).
83. MARTIN L. KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WArT 82 (1964) (quoting Letter from a Bir-
mingham Jail).
84. This Comment analyzes the shortcomings of lawful advocacy methods and the rela-
tive success of direct action. It is not meant to provide a philosophical critique of a right to
violence. For a discussion of whether and to what extent illegal activities may be justified in
the animal protection movement, see GARNER, supra note 14, at 227-30; RYDER, ANImAL
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A. Cultural and Political Power of Animal Industry
In the United States, the interests of animal enterprises are
entrenched in culture and politics. These interests are maintained
by society's pervasive use of animals and the seemingly unlimited
funds of animal enterprises. This entrenched power structure has a
chilling effect on activists' attempts to garner protection for
nonhumans.85
The use of animals saturates the United States' economy and
culture. The vast majority of U.S. residents eat animal flesh and
byproducts in the form of meat, dairy, and eggs. They wear animal
skins such as leather and fur. They use products tested on animals
- ranging from household cleaners, to cosmetics, to medication.
Finally, many people derive entertainment from animals, through
zoos, circuses, rodeos, or by hunting.
Society's seemingly infinite use of animals prevents politicians
and citizens from upending the status quo. Because animal user
interests are so fundamentally interwoven into the economy, gov-
ernment may hesitate to threaten their position."6 Robert Garner,
author of Animals, Politics, and Morality, explains, "government
action is constrained by the need to retain the confidence of the
business community (secured by not threatening their interests)
since their chances of retaining power depend largely upon the
state of the economy. '87 Citizens, too, are resistant to changing the
many aspects of their lives that are intertwined with animal use.
This phenomenon is evidenced by the millions of persons who con-
tinue to eat and wear animals for personal pleasure or convenience.
Animal enterprises also maintain the status quo directly.
Their resources are deep and are used to influence political entities
and society-at-large. Conferring millions of dollars annually,
REVOLUTION, supra note 14, at 280-87; Peter Singer, To Do or Not to Do?, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 42. There have also been a variety of writings regarding the philo-
sophical basis for a right to violence in other social justice contexts. See, e.g., Carl Cohen,
Militant Morality: Civil Disobedience and Bioethics, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec.
1989, at 23 (providing a collection of writings regarding deliberate violation of the law as a
legitimate means of social protest in the contexts of anti-abortion, AIDS, and animal rights
activism); Michael Martin, Ecosabotage and Civil Disobedience, 12 ENVTL. ETIncS 291
(1990) (analyzing philosophical justifications of ecological sabotage); see also Symposium,
Human Rights and Human Wrongs: Establishing a Jurisprudential Foundation for a Right
to Violence, 32 EMORY L.J. 383 (1983) (presenting several scholars' analyses regarding a
right to violence, human rights, and the rule of law).
85. See generally FINSEN & FINSEN, supra note 12, at 153-78 (profiling the opposition to
animal protection efforts); GARNER, supra note 14, at 230-39 (arguing that these factors radi-
cally influence animal protection efforts in Britain).
86. See GARNER, supra note 14, at 235-37.
87. GARNER, supra note 14, at 235.
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animal enterprises are some of the wealthiest contributors to the
United States political process. Federal Election Committee (FEC)
records indicate that Political Action Committees (PACs) related
to animal users contribute substantial funds to the political pro-
cess.88 For example, in the 1991-92 election cycle, the American
Medical Association (AMA), a powerful voice on behalf of animal
researchers, ranked second in contributions to federal candidates
(conferring $2,936,086) 89 and second in spending (disbursing
$6,263,921).90 Similarly, a ranking of Cooperative PACs indicate
that the food animal industry also gave significant funds to Con-
gress."' In 1991-92, the Committee for Thorough Agricultural Po-
litical Education of Associated Milk Producers, Inc. was ranked as
the top spender of all Cooperative PACs (disbursing $1,696,537).92
Mid-America Dairymen Inc. Agricultural & Dairy Educational Po-
litical Trust Adept was second (disbursing $647,013)," 3 and Dairy-
men Inc., Special Political Agricultural Community Education
PAC, was third (disbursing $386,012). 4
These wealthy industries also sponsor advertising or education
campaigns to promote animal products or discredit people who op-
pose the use of animals.9 In fact, animal users often filter these
messages through seemingly independent educational foundations
or grassroots organizations. Many of these organizations, however,
are merely puppets of animal users.98
When seeking systemic change, advocates often find them-
selves battling powerful animal enterprises. Lawful efforts towards
mere animal welfare reform are often greeted with hostility by
animal enterprises. For example, strengthened animal welfare reg-
ulations proposed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture were
88. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N, PAC AcTrVITY REBOUNDS IN 1991-1992 ELECTION CY-
CLE: UNUSUAL NATURE OF CONTESTS SEEN AS REASON 11-13 (Apr. 29, 1993) [hereinafter
FEC].
89. Id. at 13.
90. Id. at 12; see also Eric Kleiman, The AMA: Selling Out, AV MAG., Feb. 1994, at 14,
15-16 (discussing PAC money contributed to Congress by the AMA).
91. Id. at 32.
92. Id.; see also Eric Kleiman, Animal Activists Branded: Terrorists, AV MAG., Dec.
1993, at 2 (examining PAC funds contributed to Representative George Gekas (R-Pa.), who
introduced federal legislation designed to prosecute animal liberators).
93. FEC, supra note 88, at 32.
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., FINSEN & FINSEN, supra note 12, at 153-61; Brenda L. Thomas, Antimony:
The Use, Rights, and Regulation of Laboratory Animals, 13 PEPP. L. REv. 723, 726 n.17
(1986); Richard W. Stevenson, A Campaign for Research on Animals, N.Y. TImES, Jan. 20,
1989, at D5.
96. See, e.g., Laura Bird, Corporate Critics Complain Companies Hide Behind 'Grass-
Roots' Campaigns, WALL ST. J., July 8, 1992, at B1.
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challenged by the animal research community as a violation upon
scientific autonomy.9 7 Similarly, the American Medical Association
has attempted to close the legal avenues available to animal activ-
ists. In 1991, the AMA adopted a resolution calling for the AMA to
work with Congress to "prevent[] further interference with ongoing
research by animal activists, who, in the past, have been able to
use the political process to scuttle scientific projects."'98 This reso-
lution also mandated that the AMA "oppose legislation that inap-
propriately restricts the choice of scientific models and the use of
animals in research." '99
In sum, it appears that wealthy animal industries may have an
undue influence on the United States' policy making process. In
part, the status quo maintains itself without effort by animal en-
terprises through a complacent populace. When animal enterprises
add their vast resources to general public apathy, they are able to
influence policy formation, public perceptions, and the electoral
process. Due to the above factors, animal industries are a colossal
opponent to lawful animal protection efforts.
B. Animal Protection Statutes
Many argue that despite powerful animal users, nonhumans
are adequately protected through humane legislation. A cursory
analysis of animal welfare statutes, however, indicates that these
laws provide little meaningful animal protection. Though an ex-
haustive analysis of every animal protection statute is beyond the
scope of this Comment, a brief glance at a few of these laws indi-
cates that they are poorly enforced and tend to have significant
loopholes that overlook widespread cruelty.100
1. Protection of Animals Used for Food
Two federal statutes have traditionally pertained to animals
used for food - the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act
(HMSA)1°0 and the Twenty-Eight Hour Law. 2 Though these stat-
97. Robert J. Masonis, Comment, The Improved Standards for Laboratory Animals
Act and the Proposed Regulations: A Glimmer of Hope in the Battle Against Abusive
Animal Research, 16 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. RE V. 149, 162-66 (1988) (analyzing the response of
the National Association for Biomedical Research to proposed regulations under the Im-
proved Standards for Laboratory Animals Act).
98. Andrew A. Skolnick, AMA Asked to Seek Protection for Researchers From Politi-
cal Interference by Animal Activists, 266 JAMA 462 (1991) (emphasis added).
99. Id.
100. A concise summary of federal statutes that concern animal protection can be
found in Henry Cohen, Federal Animal Protection Statutes, 1 ANIMAL L. 143 (1995).
101. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1906 (1988); 9 C.F.R. § 313.1-.90 (1995).
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utes were created in part to make the transport and slaughter of
food animals more humane, 03 animal advocates claim that the
protection these statutes provide to nonhumans is minimal.10 4
The Twenty Eight Hour Law provides:
[Animals transported by] a rail carrier, express carrier, or common carrier
(except by air or water) .... or an owner or master of a vessel transporting
animals [across state lines] may not confine animals in a vehicle or vessel
for more than 28 consecutive hours without unloading the animals for feed-
ing, water, and rest.105
The statute provides an exemption for animals who are trans-
ported by a vehicle or vessel in which they have "food, water,
space, and an opportunity for rest."' 06 The twenty-eight hour pe-
riod may also be extended for (1) "unavoidable causes," (2) upon
written request of the owner or person in custody of the animals,
or (3) for sheep "when the twenty-eight hour period of confine-
ment ends at night."1
0 7
The Humane Methods of Slaughter Act merely requires that
animals be "rendered insensible to pain by a single blow or gun-
shot or an electrical, chemical or other means that is rapid and
effective, before being shackled, hoisted, thrown, cast, or cut."' 08
The law allows the slaughter of conscious animals during ritual or
kosher slaughter. 0 9
Probably the most grievous misfortune posed by both the
HMSA and the Twenty-Eight Hour Law is that neither statute ap-
pears to accomplish its asserted purpose of protecting farm ani-
mals from needless suffering. As just one example, columnist Col-
man McCarthy describes an instance of humane transport and
slaughter:
Some 250,000 horses, including a large percentage of thoroughbreds, are
killed annually in the United States, where their flesh brings up to a dollar
102. 45 U.S.C. §§ 71-74 (1988), repealed and amended by 49 U.S.C.A. § 80502 (West
Supp. 1995).
103. The HMSA states in its declaration of policy: "The Congress finds that the use of
humane methods in the slaughter of livestock prevents needless suffering ... .' 7 U.S.C.
§ 1901. Similarly, as originally enacted, the Twenty-Eight Hour Law specified that animals
should be transported in a "humane manner." 45 U.S.C. § 71 (1986).
104. For a general discussion regarding the inadequacies of animal protection laws as
they relate to farm animals, see Steven M. Wise, Of Farm Animals and Justice, 3 PACE
ENvrL. L. REV. 191 (1986).
105. 49 U.S.C.A. § 80502(a)(1).
106. 49 U.S.C.A. § 80502(c)
107. 49 U.S.C.A. § 80502(a)(2).
108. 7 U.S.C. § 1902(a).
109. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1902(b), 1906.
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a pound.
The common practice is to pack horses into double-deck cattle trucks
- 45 to 50 animals a load - and haul them to one of nine slaughterhouses,
from Connecticut to Oregon. Along the way they are not fed, watered or
rested.
* * , [At the slaughterhouse, the] 'horse is hit in the head with a tool
known as a stun gun that jams a rod into a horse's brain to the depth of
four inches. Then the rod retracts. The horse falls into a chute, then is
hoisted by its hind legs. Its throat is slit, and it is butchered.'110
This description of transport and slaughter leaves one to question
whether this reality of animal agri-business constitutes humane
treatment. Though the transport and slaughter may be in technical
compliance with the law, they do not appear to be humane in
practice.""
Furthermore, the HMSA has a limited definition of livestock.
The HMSA encompasses cattle, horses, sheep, and pigs; poultry
and fish are outside its scope." 2 Thus, many animals used for food
do not receive even the cursory protection of this statute.
Perhaps most significantly, animals used for food are not pro-
vided even a modicum of federal protection at times other than
transport and slaughter. In fact, animal advocates have been rebuf-
fed when proposing that the federal government take more sub-
stantial steps to protect farm animals.1 3 Thus, it appears that ac-
110. Colman McCarthy, From Track to Butcher, WASH. PosT, June 4, 1994, at A19
(quoting an article from the Lexington (Ky.) Herald-Leader).
111. See supra note 6 (delineating resources which describe the treatment of animals
raised under intensive farming conditions).
112. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1902, 1906.
113. An example of the legislature's disinterest in protecting farm animals is evident in
the committee hearings for the proposed Farm Animal and Research Facilities Protection
Act of 1989, a precursor to the Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992 (AEPA). See dis-
cussion of the AEPA infra part V.B. The following is an excerpt from the statement of John
F. Kullberg, President of the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals,
during questioning by Representative Harold L. Volkmer before the, Subcommittee on De-
partment Operations, Research, and Foreign Agriculture of the House Committee on
Agriculture:
Mr. Kullberg. [I hope Congress enacts] veal calf legislation. What goes on in the
name of raising calves for the white veal trade today is horrendous by any objec-
tive person who looks at it, but we allow it to continue, and hopefully this Con-
gress is going to change some of those things.
Mr. Volkmer. Well, Mr. Kullberg... I think you're close to being.., radical....
Is it cruelty to an animal for a person to raise chickens in order to eat them?
Mr. Kullberg. It depends on how they raise the chicken, sir.
Mr. Volkmer. Those people raise the chicken, they cut off their head, they take
the feathers off, take all the guts out, and they cut them up and fry them and eat
them. Is that cruelty? ....
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tivists who wish to protect food animals must look beyond federal
law.
2. Laboratory Animal Protection
The federal Animal Welfare Act (AWA) regulates the treat-
ment of animals used in research.114 The Animal Welfare Act has
various delineated purposes, including the provision of humane
treatment to animals used in research facilities, exhibitions, or as
pets.115 Despite this legislation, it appears animal activists legiti-
mately claim that laboratory animals do not receive adequate
protection."16
Mr. Kullberg. If the ethologist tells me that to debeak that chicken and to put
three of them in a cage 1 feet by 1 /2 feet and to let them live out their lives in
that condition, [then] that's cruel....
Mr. Volkmer. Well, you have yet to persuade me ... that there is sufficient cru-
elty to animals by farmers that I need to pass legislation to protect those animals.
Farm Animal and Research Facilities Protection Act of 1989: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Dep't Operations, Research, and Foreign Agric. of the House Comm. on Agric.,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 45-47 (July 17, 1990) [hereinafter Farm Animal Hearings]. Similarly,
activists have lobbied for the Humane Methods of Poultry Slaughter Act (H.R. 649), the
Veal Calf Protection Act (H.R. 1455) and the Downed Animal Protection Act (S. 367 and
H.R. 559). To date, none of these efforts have succeeded in being made into law.
114. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (1988 & Supp. II 1988); 9 C.F.R. §§ 1-4 (1995).
115. The asserted purpose of the Animal Welfare Act is
(1) to ensure that animals intended for use in research facilities or for exhibition
purposes or for use as pets are provided humane care and treatment; (2) to assure
the humane treatment of animals during transportation in commerce; and (3) to
protect the owners of animals from the theft of their animals by preventing the
sale or use of animals which have been stolen.
7 U.S.C. § 2131. The AWA is also intended to regulate the "transportation, purchase, sale,
housing, care, handling, and treatment of animals by carriers or by persons or organizations
engaged in using them for research or experimental purposes or for exhibition purposes or
holding them for sale as pets or for any such purpose or use." Id.
116. For a comprehensive analysis of laboratory animal treatment and the Animal Wel-
fare Act, see GARY L. FRANcIoNE, AimmALS, PROPERTY AND THE LAW 165-250 (1995) [hereinaf-
ter FRANCIONE, ANmALS AND PROPERTY]; Mimi Brody, Animal Research: A Call for Legisla-
tive Reform Requiring Ethical Merit Review, 13 HARv. ENvm. L. REv. 423 (1989); Esther F.
Dukes, The Improved Standards for Laboratory Animals Act: Will It Ensure That the
Policy of the Animal Welfare Act Becomes a Reality?, 31 ST. Louis U. L.J. 519 (1987);
Lorin M. Subar, Out from Under the Microscope: A Case for Laboratory Animal Rights, 2
DET. C.L. REv. 511 (1987); Thomas, supra note 95; David L. Boman, Note, All Animals Are
Equal But Some Animals Are More Equal Than Others: Recent Developments in Efforts to
Enhance the Protection of Animals, 30 WASHBURN L.J. 271, 285-89 (1991); Thomas A. De-
Capo, Note, Challenging Objectionable Animal Treatment with the Shareholder Proxy
Proposal Rule, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 119, 126-31 [hereinafter Challenging Treatment]; Ron-
ald D. Dudeck, Comment, The Use of Animals in Medical Research and Testing: Does the
Tail Wag the Dog?, 14 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 87 (1987); Masonis, supra note 97; Karen L.
McDonald, Comment, Creating a Private Cause of Action Against Abusive Animal Re-
search, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 399, 402-08 (1986).
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Like the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act and the Twenty-
Eight Hour Law, the Animal Welfare Act narrowly defines animal
and animal enterprises; 1 7 consequently, many nonhumans are ex-
cluded from its scope. 1 8 Under the AWA and its corresponding
regulations, birds, rats, mice, cold-blooded animals, and insects are
not protected. 1 9 In practice, these exclusions mean that approxi-
mately 85% of all animals used in research are denied federal pro-
tection. 20 The Animal Welfare Act is also of limited usefulness be-
cause many animal facilities are outside its scope. 121 The AWA's
definitions of dealer 22 and exhibitor123 specifically exclude retail
pet stores, state and county fairs, livestock shows, rodeos, and
purebred dog and cat shows.
Probably one of the most distressing aspects of the Animal
117. 7 U.S.C. § 2132.
118. 7 U.S.C. § 2132(g).
119. The Animal Welfare Act defines animal as follows:
The term "animal" means any live or dead dog, cat, monkey (nonhuman primate
mammal), guinea pig, hamster, rabbit, or such other warm-blooded animal, as the
Secretary may determine is being used, or is intended for use, for research, test-
ing, experimentation, or exhibition purposes, or as a pet; but such term excludes
horses not used for research purposes and other farm animals, such as, but not
limited to livestock or poultry, used or intended for use as food or fiber, or live-
stock or poultry used or intended for use for improving animal nutrition, breeding,
management, or production efficiency, or for improving the quality of food or fi-
ber. With respect to a dog, the term means all dogs including those used for hunt-
ing, security, or breeding purposes ....
7 U.S.C. § 2132(g).
Unlike the statute itself, regulations explicitly exclude birds, rats, and mice from the
definition of animal. 9 C.F.R § 1.1 (1995). This exclusion was challenged in court by the
Animal Legal Defense Fund. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held that
the plaintiffs had standing to sue and the regulation was reviewable under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994). Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Yeutter, 760
F.Supp. 923 (D.D.C. 1991). Finding that the regulation was arbitrary and capricious, the
court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the merits. Animal Legal
Defense Fund v. Madigan, 781 F. Supp. 797 (D.D.C. 1992). On appeal, the lower court deci-
sion was vacated. The appellate court found that the plaintiffs lacked constitutional stand-
ing and did not have a statutory right to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure
Act. Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1994). See also Henry
Cohen, The Legality of the Agriculture Department's Exclusion of Rats and Mice from
Coverage Under the Animal Welfare Act, 31 ST. Louis U. L.J. 543 (1987) (arguing that the
Secretary's exclusion of rats and mice from the Animal Welfare Act is inconsistent with the
Act and is therefore illegal).
120. ALDF Wins Rights for Rats & Mice In Research, ANIMALS' ADVOCATE (Animal
Legal Defense Fund, San Rafael, Cal.), Spring 1992, at 1, 7. The American Medical Associa-
tion estimates that 12 to 15 million animals are used in biomedical research each year and
that 75% to 90% of these animals are rodents. AMA White Paper, supra note 8, at 2.
121. 7 U.S.C. § 2132.
122. 7 U.S.C. § 2132(f).
123. 7 U.S.C. § 2132(h).
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Welfare Act is that it provides only nominal protection to the ani-
mals covered. Although the AWA regulates the care, housing, and
feeding of research animals, these provisions are commonly be-
lieved to be weak and ineffectual. 124 Problems with the AWA in-
clude (1) the failure of the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA) to protect animals in noncompliant laboratories, (2) poor
government enforcement of the act, (3) a lack of a private cause of
action for activists, (4) Institutional Animal Care and Use Commit-
tees that fall to secure appropriate animal care, and (5) inadequate
statutory mechanisms to prevent animal pain.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture's ability to protect ani-
mals is impaired by the limited sanctions available under the AWA
for noncompliance. 2 5 The AWA provides that the Secretary shall
promulgate rules allowing for the confiscation or destruction of any
animal who is suffering due to noncompliance with the AWA; how-
ever, a significant exception is made for animals in research facili-
ties.' 26 Specifically, the statute provides that laboratory animals
may only be confiscated if they are "no longer required by such
research facility to carry out the research, test, or experiment for
which such animal has been utilized . "... ,,12 Thus, despite any
potential violations, the experiment is deemed more important
than the animal. Therefore, the experiment, rather than the
animal's suffering, determines the action taken.
Enforcement of the Animal Welfare Act also remains deficient
due to the USDA's reluctance to administer the statute.12 As ex-
plained by author Esther Dukes:
For fiscal years 1983, 1984, and 1985, the USDA proposed that funding for
animal welfare inspections be reduced or eliminated .... Moreover, APHIS
[Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service] inspectors devote little time
to animal welfare inspections. Indeed, APHIS veterinary medical officers
who conduct AWA inspections spend only about six percent of their time on
124. See, e.g., Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Secretary of Agric., 813 F. Supp. 882
(D.D.C. 1993) (striking down United States Department of Agriculture regulations because
they were arbitrary and capricious and did not provide the minimum standards required by
Congress), vacated by Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 29 F.3d 720 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (concluding the appellees lacked standing to challenge the regulations promulgated
under the Animal Welfare Act); see also supra note 116 (providing sources which analyze
weaknesses in the AWA).
125. 7 U.S.C. § 2146(b).
126. 7 U.S.C. § 2146(b).
127. 7 U.S.C. § 2146(a).
128. FRANcIoNE, ANmmALS AND PROPERTY, supra note 116, at 211-33; Dukes, supra note
116, at 525-37; Challenging Treatment, supra note 116, at 129-30; Masonis, supra note 97,




It seems that current USDA enforcement efforts are insufficient as
well. Though federal laboratories must adhere to the AWA, they
are not inspected for compliance by the Regulatory Enforcement
and Animal Care (REAC) unit of APHIS.13 0 Regarding non-federal
facilities, the average number of compliance inspections conducted
has gradually increased over the years; however, by 1992 the in-
spection rate reached only 1.87 inspections annually per site.181 In
fact, a mere $500,000, five percent of the Animal Welfare Pro-
gram's $9,594,000 annual budget, was devoted to regulatory en-
forcement.132 Finally, when noncompliance is identified, prosecu-
tions for violations of the AWA remain rare.1
33
Furthermore, activists may not be able to intervene when
animal protection efforts by researchers and APHIS are deficient.
In International Primate Protection League v. Institute for Be-
havioral Research, Inc., the Fourth Circuit held that the Animal
Welfare Act does not authorize private individuals or organizations
to be named guardians of research animals seized from a medical
research facility whose chief is convicted for violations of state
animal cruelty laws. 34 The court barred an implied cause of action,
stating:
To imply a cause of action in these plaintiffs might entail serious conse-
quences. It might open the use of animals in biomedical research to the
hazards and vicissitudes of courtroom litigation. It may draw judges into the
supervision and regulation of laboratory research.... In fact, we are per-
suaded that Congress intended that the independence of medical research
be respected and that administrative enforcement govern the Animal Wel-
fare Act."3 5
Thus, it appears that for now, the Secretary of Agriculture is the
exclusive enforcer of the AWA. 13
Though the AWA does not currently appear to give activists a
129. Dukes, supra note 116, at 526.
130. 1992 USDA ANIMAL WELFARE ENFORCEMENT 6-7.
131. Id. at 3.
132. Id. at 5.
133. Dukes, supra note 116, at 533; McDonald, supra note 116, at 404-05.
134. 799 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1004 (1987).
135. Id. at 935.
136. But see Marci Messett, Note, They Asked for Protection and They Got Policy:
International Primate's Mutilated Monkeys, 21 AKRON L. REv. 97 (1987) (arguing that the
Animal Welfare Act provisions can be interpreted to provide a private cause of action).
Representative Charles Rose (D-NC) sponsored H.R. 4535, an unsuccessful bill which pro-
posed that the Animal Welfare Act be amended to allow private enforcement. Boman, supra
note 116, at 288 nn.113-14 and accompanying text.
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private cause of action, it requires the creation of Institutional
Animal Care and Use Committees (IACUCs).3 7 IACUCs were cre-
ated to provide internal inspection and review of the treatment of
animals used in research."' 8 Animal activists claim that many
IACUCs fail to provide adequate protection for animals in labora-
tories. By law, IACUCs may have an unlimited number of mem-
bers; 3 9 however, at least one of these committee members must
"provide representation for general community interests in the
proper care and treatment of animals ..... 10 Nonetheless, many
researchers may attempt to prevent animal advocates from becom-
ing committee members. These animal experimenters fear activists
would disrupt or gain control of the IACUCs and, "given their phi-
losophy, would deny most proposed experiments."'' Conse-
quently, IACUCs are often solely comprised of experimenters and
their allies. For this reason, the committees tend to become rub-
ber-stamping mechanisms for research activities instead of a
means to protect animals from cruelty.1
42
The AWA also exercises limited influence over the use of ani-
mals during experiments. For example, pain relieving drugs, anes-
thesia, or euthanasia may all be withheld from an animal when sci-
entifically necessary.145 Researchers may also use an animal in
more than one major operative experiment if there is scientific ne-
cessity.14 4 To prove scientific necessity a researcher is merely re-
quired to specify that animal pain is necessary to the research pro-
tocol and file a report with the IACUC explaining the
137. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(b).
138. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(b)(3).
139. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(b)(1).
140. 7 U.S.C. § 2143 (b)(1)(B).
141. AMA White Paper, supra note 8, at 21.
142. One such example of anti-animal protection bias occurred at the Letterman Army
Institute of Research in San Francisco. Jan Polon Novic, a former public member of Letter-
man's IACUC, stated in testimony prepared for a congressional hearing: "'Humane con-
cerns about animals, or the necessity for the research, almost never entered the picture...
resulting in the waste of millions of tax dollars and thousands of animals' lives annually."'
Rick DelVecchio, Letterman Institute Rapped for Animal Work: Ex-Panel Member Alleges
Waste, Cruelty, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 8, 1992, at A16. In her testimony, she recalled experi-
ments in which "animals were burned with lasers, insects were 'allowed to feed on the
shaven skin of rabbits, pigs were nearly bled to death, and rabbits were subjected to eye
surgery without medication to relieve their pain." Id. Polon Novic said she "cast the lone
dissenting vote on ninety percent of the research proposals" that came before the IACUC
and that she was "dismissed after complaining to Representative Barbara Boxer (D-CA)
about committee procedures." Id. A spokeswoman for Letterman said Polon Novic was ter-
minated from the committee because "she went beyond her role as representative of the
public on animal care and sought to evaluate the scientific merit of research proposals." Id.
143. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(3)(C)(v).
144. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(3)(D).
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experimenter's belief. 4 5 Due to the nature of IACUCs, 4 this stat-
utory loophole essentially allows the infliction of pain on animals
to go unchecked.1
47
In sum, the AWA is profoundly deficient in several key areas.
At best, the statute provides minimal protection to a small fraction
of animals used in research. Thus, the federal government appears
to be shirking its statutory and ethical duty to protect the well-
being of animals in laboratories. While animal liberators would
likely object to almost all animal research in principle, the AWA
arguably allows even the most heinous research practices to be in-
flicted on laboratory animals without restraint.
3. State Anti-Cruelty Statutes
Persons who argue that current legislation adequately protects
animals may also attempt to cite state anti-cruelty laws in their
support. All fifty states have enacted some form of criminal statute
prohibiting cruelty to animals. Though these statutes vary signifi-
cantly by state, a few trends may be identified across jurisdictions.
Like the federal animal welfare laws, state anti-cruelty statutes fail
to ensure animal protection. 48
In his book, Animal Rights and the Law, author Daniel S.
Moretti provides an overview of anti-cruelty statutes from each
state.14 9 He explains:
The key to determining what sort of act constitutes cruelty in each state
depends on several factors. First, how does the law define animal? Second,
what kind of activities are expressly or impliedly exempted from cruelty?
Third, what level of intent is required for conviction? Fourth, is the punish-
ment imposed for cruelty an effective one? Fifth, is the anti-cruelty law ef-
fectively enforced?
50
Each of these components of state anti-cruelty laws is addressed
below.
Whether a being constitutes an animal as defined under state
anti-cruelty legislation varies significantly by state. Most states use
a broad definition of animal that includes all living creatures ex-
cept humans. However, some states use a more narrow interpreta-
tion of animal that only encompasses domesticated or warm-
145. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(3)(E).
146. For a discussion of IACUCs see supra notes 137-142 and accompanying text.
147. Challenging Treatment, supra note 116, at 128-29.
148. FRANCxNE, ANimAIs AN PROPERTY, supra note 116, at 119-60.
149. DANIEL S. MORETTI, ANIMAL RIGHTS AND THE LAW 1-39 (1984).
150. Id. at 2.
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blooded animals. Still others provide no definition at all.15'
States have also adopted various definitions regarding cruelty
to animals. Many jurisdictions define cruelty as "an act, failure to
act, or neglect that causes unjustifiable or unnecessary pain to an
animal. '152 There is disagreement, however, about what acts are
unjustifiable or unnecessary. For instance, a strict reading of these
statutes could prohibit the wearing of animal skins because this
practice is unnecessary to the well-being of both humans and ani-
mals. Also, affirmative defenses such as acts of discipline, acts in
protection of property, and acts in protection of humans have all
been upheld by various courts as necessary or justified behavior. 15 3
Certain exemptions further weaken state statutes. For exam-
ple, most states have implicitly or explicitly exempted animal ex-
perimentation. 1 5  Routine hunting, trapping, fishing, and slaugh-
tering are also outside the scope of state anti-cruelty statutes.
55
Additionally, many states have limited the impact of their
anti-cruelty statutes by requiring a high level of intent to convict
humans under these statutes. A few states merely require a show-
ing of ordinary or criminal negligence to warrant conviction. 56
Most jurisdictions, however, demand that an offender's actions be
committed recklessly, knowingly, intentionally, willfully, or even
maliciously to constitute the crime of cruelty to animals.
15 7
Punishment for the offense of cruelty to animals also varies
widely by jurisdiction. 58 Almost all the state statutes provide fines
and imprisonment. Judges, however, are often reluctant to im-
prison persons for this offense 5 9 and fines tend to be minimal. 60
151. Id. at 3.
152. Id. (emphasis added).
153. Sonja A. Soehnel, Annotation, What Constitutes Offense of Cruelty to Animals -
Modern Cases, 6 A.L.R.5TH 733, 869-82 §§ 28-31 (1993).
154. See, e.g., Taub v. State, 463 A.2d 819 (Md. 1983); New Jersey Soc'y for Prevention
of Cruelty to Animals v. Bd. of Educ., 219 A.2d 200 (N.J. 1966); Thomas R. Malia, Annota-
tion, Applicability of State Animal Cruelty Statute to Medical or Scientific Experimenta-
tion Employing Animals, 42 A.L.R.4TH 860 (1994); but see Larry Falkin, Taub v. State: Are
State Anti-Cruelty Statutes Sleeping Giants?, 2 PACE ENvTL. L. REv. 255 (1985) (arguing
that animal researchers should be convicted under state anti-cruelty laws for unreasonable
infliction of pain and suffering upon animals).
155. MoR=r, supra note 149, at 3.
156. Soehnel, supra note 153, at 769-73 §§ 8-9, 11.
157. Id. at 761-69 §§ 3-7.
158. See FRANcIoNE, ANIMALS AND PROPERTY supra note 116, at 156-58 (providing a
synopsis of penalties and enforcement difficulties relating to state anti-cruelty laws).
159. MoRE-r, supra note 149, at 6.
160. ROLLN, supra note 16, at 79. Typical maximum penalties under state anti-cruelty
statutes are fines of up to $500 - $1000 and/or as much as a one year jail sentence. These
maximum penalties are rarely invoked. Id.
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Consequently, these penalties do not typically deter injury to
animals.""
Finally, anti-cruelty statutes are not effectively enforced.
16 2
Moretti explains: "Very few people who commit cruelty are ever
brought into a courtroom and prosecuted.... In light of the small
amount of money being spent to enforce anti-cruelty laws, it is ob-
vious that state legislatures have not taken as much of an interest
in animal welfare as they might have."6 3 Due to these substantial
shortcomings, current animal protection statutes provide little sub-
stantive protection for animals, and activists often find these laws
to be of limited utility in securing humane treatment for
nonhumans.1'6
C. Standing
Despite weaknesses in anti-cruelty laws, activists have repeat-
edly attempted to use the courts to secure protection for animals.
In these cases, one of the most difficult problems facing activists
involves standing. Courts often find that activists fail to meet the
burden of establishing standing and activists' claims are therefore
dismissed." 5
The constitutional requirement for standing is found in Arti-
cle III of the United States Constitution. 66 This provision limits
the jurisdiction of federal courts to cases and controversies.67 To
meet the constitutional requirements for standing, plaintiffs must
show that (1) they have suffered some actual or threatened injury,
i.e., injury in fact;'68 (2) the injury is traceable to the challenged
161. See, e.g., Merritt Clifton & The Animal Legal Defense Fund, Judging Cruelty: No
Time for Animals, AmMAS' AGENDA, May 1992, at 24, 24-25 (discussing meager sentences
for persons convicted under animal cruelty statutes).
162. ROLLIN, supra note 16, at 79; Merritt Clifton, Horse Starvation, EQUUS, Oct.
1992, at 14 (addressing scarcity of convictions in cases of equine abuse).
163. MoRETrI, supra note 149, at 6-7.
164. See FRANCIoNE, ANIMALS AND PROPERTY, supra note 116, at 135-60 (reviewing state
anti-cruelty prosecutions).
165. Analysis of standing barriers for animal activists may be found in Bridget Klauber,
See No Evil, Hear No Evil: The Federal Courts and the Silver Spring Monkeys, 63 U.
COLO. L. REv. 501 (1992); Wise, supra note 104, at 213-18; Boman, supra note 116, at 273-
84; Challenging Treatment, supra note 116, at 133-37; Dudeck, supra note 116, at 96-98; A.
Camille Holton, Note, International Primate Protection League v. Institute for Behavioral
Research: The Standing of Animal Protection Organizations Under the Animal Welfare
Act, 4 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 469 (1988); McDonald, supra note 116, at 421-31;
Messett, supra note 136.
166. U.S. CONsT. art. HI, § 2.
167. Id.
168. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). An
organization may gain representational standing by showing injury to itself or to the mem-
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action; and, (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable
decision. 169 Oftentimes, plaintiffs must also show that their as-
serted injury is within the zone of interests regulated by the stat-
ute under which they are suing.17 0 Under current standing inter-
pretations, courts often find that animal activists fail to meet the
injury in fact and zone of interests criteria.
Courts have frequently recognized that activists may have
standing to litigate cases involving wild animals. In these cases,
judges have found that the activists will suffer some aesthetic or
recreational harm if a proposed action is taken against the free-
roaming animals.17 1 Courts have also typically held, however, that
activists do not have standing when the animal in question is not
free-roaming, but is owned by another person. In these cases,
animal advocates may not allege economic detriment because they
do not own the animal harmed. Also, if the animal is not on public
lands, the advocates suffer no aesthetic or recreational harm and
are further restricted in gaining standing. Thus, activists who wish
to bring suit to protect an animal from its owner, whether the
owner is a fur farmer or an animal research facility, often have
difficulty meeting the standing requirement of injury in fact.
172
Furthermore, courts find that many animal protection stat-
utes, including the Animal Welfare Act, do not provide an express
or implied private right of action under which activists may sue.
Consequently, activists frequently cannot use animal protection
statutes to gain standing because their claims are found to be
bers it represents. David J. Oliveiri, Annotation, Requirements of Article III of Federal
Constitution as Affecting Standing to Challenge Particular Conduct as Violative of Fed-
eral Law - Supreme Court Cases, 70 L.R.A.2D 941 § 3c.
169. Oliveiri, supra note 168, at 941 § 4.
170. 397 U.S. at 150; Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
171. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS AND PROPERTY, supra note 116, at 69-72 and accompanying
notes; Boman, supra note 116, at 274, 280-84. See, e.g., Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American
Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986); Humane Soc'y of the United States v. Hodel, 840 F.2d
45 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Alaska Fish & Wildlife Fed'n v. Dunkle, 829 F.2d 933 (9th Cir 1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 988 (1988); Animal Welfare Inst. v. Kreps, 561 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978); Wilkins v. Lugan, 798 F. Supp. 557 (E.D. Mo.
1992), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.; Wilkins v. Secretary of the Interior, 995 F.2d 850
(8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 921 (1994); American Horse Protection Ass'n, Inc. v.
Frizzell, 403 F. Supp. 1206 (D.Nev. 1975).
172. See, e.g., Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 29 F.3d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1994);
Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1994); International Pri-
mate Protection League v. Administrators of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 895 F.2d 1056 (5th
Cir. 1990), rev'd, 500 U.S. 72 (1991); International Primate Protection League v. Institute
for Behavioral Research, Inc., 799 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1004
(1987); Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n v. Weinberger, 765 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1985); Walz v.
Baum, 345 N.Y.S.2d 159 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973) (mem.); Pennsylvania Soc'y for the Preven-
tion of Cruelty to Animals v. Bravo Enters., 237 A.2d 342 (Pa. 1968).
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outside the statutes' zones of interests.73
For individual activists and animal protection organizations to
overcome current standing impediments, they must make a
"roundabout and often unavailing demonstration" that their rights
are being invaded. 7 4 Predictably, these claims often fall short of
what is required. In fact, as standing doctrine has been applied in
the context of animal protection cases, there has been a trend in
judicial determinations. Animal activists, whether individuals or
organizations, are generally denied access to the courts where they
do not own the animal, the animal is confined to private property,
and the claimants do not have a statutory basis on which to sue. 75
Due to these standing guidelines, animal advocates are frequently
foreclosed from using the courts to secure animal protection.
While a few scholars have proposed an expanded standing
doctrine for animal protectors," this remedy fails to address the
more pressing and fundamental problem perceived by activists -
i.e., the law has yet to grant legal rights and standing to animals
themselves. 177 If animals themselves had standing, suits could be
brought to recover for their injuries and there would be no need to
find an indirect injury to a human.
Thus, in justifying their decision to pursue illegal tactics, lib-
erators may point to substantial cultural, political, economic and
philosophical obstacles to their abolitionist agenda. In addition, le-
gal barriers to animal protection are substantial. Animal welfare
statutes are typically ineffective. Standing barriers for activists and
animals are monumental. In addition, other newly created legal
barriers to animal protection are continually being introduced. 78
173. See, e.g., Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 29 F.3d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1994);
Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1994); International Pri-
mate, 799 F.2d 934.
174. Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? - Toward Legal Rights for
Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450, 466 (1972) [hereinafter Stone, Standing 1].
175. Boman, supra note 116, at 273-84.
176. See e.g., Klauber, supra note 165, at 510-20 (suggesting expansion of standing doc-
trine to allow altruism, ethical interests, and a broadened third party rule); McDonald,
supra note 116, at 399, 421-31 (proposing that animal protection groups be granted standing
to challenge unacceptable research on laboratory animals using a public nuisance action).
177. ToM REGAN, ALL THAT DWELL THEREIN: ANIMAL RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETH-
ICs 152 (1982). It is beyond the scope of this article to propose exactly which animals should
have exactly which rights. For discussion of these issues, see supra notes 17 and 22.
178. Other methods have been used to hinder activists' efforts to protect animals. For
instance, many states have created hunter harassment statutes to deter anti-hunting activ-
ity. For an analysis of hunter harassment legislation, see Dorman v. Satti, 678 F. Supp. 375
(D.C. Conn.), aff'd, 862 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1099 (1989) (declaring
Connecticut's Hunter Harassment Act unconstitutional); Ugalde, supra note 10; Frank J.
Wozniak, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Statutes Prohibiting Harassment of
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Animal oppression is entrenched in the United States and lawful
change on behalf of nonhumans appears to be glacial. Conse-
quently, animal liberators may feel compelled to challenge the sta-
tus quo through direct action. They believe that lawful channels of
advocacy, used in isolation, will achieve only minimal change over
a prolonged period of time.17 9 Meanwhile, the needs of nonhumans
are urgent.
IV. MEASURING THE LIBERATOR'S ACHIEVEMENTS
Those who profess to favor freedom, and yet depreciate agitation, are men
who want crops without plowing up the ground. They want rain without
thunder and lightening. They want the ocean without the awful roar of its
many waters. This struggle may be a moral one; or it may be a physical one;
or it may be both moral and physical; but it must be a struggle. Power
concedes nothing without a demand. 80
- Frederick Douglass
Animal liberators may contest that they use illegal methods to
secure animal protection because they have been essentially fore-
closed from pursuing legal avenues of change. Even so, one must
still inquire whether unlawful tactics are more successful than
their legal counterparts. This section will review the liberators'
achievements by analyzing their impact on the animals, the public,
animal enterprises, and the animal protection movement as a
whole.
A. Impact on the Animals: Liberation
Over the past fifteen years, animal liberators have successfully
aided numerous animals. Likening themselves to abolitionists dur-
ing the slave era,18' liberators have freed at least 4,417 nonhumans
Hunters, Fishermen, or Trappers, 17 A.L.R.5TH 837 (1994).
In addition, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, i.e., SLAPP suits, are fre-
quently instituted by targets of animal rights activism. In these suits, animal enterprises
may allege they were defamed or harassed by animal rights activists. The animal facilities
often seek monetary damages from individual activists and animal protection organizations.
For discussion of SLAPP suits against animal activists, see FINSEN & FINSEN, supra note 12,
at 172-73; SCARCE, supra note 35, at 132-33; Stephen J. Adler, Boston Aquarium Counter-
sues Activists, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 1991, at B6; Sam Atwood, Activists Pay Price for
Speaking Out, USA TODAY, Dec. 18, 1990, at 1OA; Fox Butterfield, Claiming Harassment,
Aquarium Sues 3 Animal Rights Groups, N.Y. TnmEs, Oct. 1, 1991, at A18.
179. JASPER & NFsmN, supra note 13, at 49; Windeatt, supra note 49, at 191-92.
180. KiiMBERLEY A. BOBO ET AL., ORGANIZING FOR SOCIAL CHANGE: A MANUAL FOR ACTIV-
ISTS IN THE 1990S (1991) (prefatory material) (letter to an abolitionist associate (1849)).
181. McClain, supra note 38, at 139.
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in the United States. 18 2 These animals have included dogs, cats,
monkeys, mice, rabbits, hens, horses, dolphins, and coyotes."'
Animal protectors report that captive animals are removed from
animal enterprises, given necessary medical care by sympathetic
veterinarians,""' and placed on the Underground Railroad until
safe, permanent homes are found.1
8 5
The animal research community and its sympathizers allege
that many of the nonhumans stolen from animal enterprises suffer
greatly when they are released from confinement.8 6 Author Robert
Garner rebuts this argument:
The animal research community often claim[s] that this [animal release] is
irresponsible either because the rescued (or stolen, depending on your point
of view) animals are incapable of survival in the wild or because they would
make unsuitable pets. Whether or not this is true (and information on their
destination is of course clouded in secrecy), since the animals may have suf-
fered and would almost certainly have died in the laboratory anyway, it is
unlikely that their treatment will be any worse in the hands of the animal
liberators. Certainly, we have no reason to believe that the animals taken
are not generally treated with care and responsibility. Indeed, whatever else
may be said about the activists involved, it is faintly ridiculous, given their
beliefs and the lengths to which they are prepared to go to follow them, to
suggest that they would do otherwise.187
Thus, it seems likely that most of the nonhumans released from
animal facilities live a life which is just as good as, if not better
than, what they would have experienced under the dominion of
animal industry.
Although thousands of individual animals have been saved by
182. PETA, History of Liberation, supra note 55. The Animal Liberation Front esti-
mates that nearly 6000 animals had been liberated worldwide during the first 12 years of
animal liberation activity. Animal Liberation Front, The Animal Rights Movement Should
Use Economic Sabotage, ANimAL RIGHTS: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 205, 208 (Janelle Rohr ed.,
1989) [hereinafter ALF, OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS]. People for Animal Liberation, an Animal
Liberation Front support group, estimates that "tens of thousands of animals have been
rescued" through direct action. ALF Primer, supra note 40.
183. PETA, History of Liberation, supra note 55.
184. JASPER & NELKIN, supra note 13, at 34; SCARCE, supra note 35, at 216 (providing
an example of an understanding veterinarian who treated cats liberated from a laboratory).
185. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., MARQUARDT, supra note 37, at xii (asserting that over 1000 animals were
removed from a University of Arizona laboratory and delivered to a desert "in which tem-
peratures exceeded 100 degrees and where they [the animals] faced agonizing death from
dehydration."); Value of 2 Dolphins Set Free in '77 at Issue in Hawaii Case, N.Y. TNIEs,
Mar. 8, 1982, at A14 [hereinafter Value of 2 Dolphins] ("Researchers at the laboratory said
they believed that the two dolphins either were killed by predators, such as sharks, or died
of starvation because they could not feed themselves.").
187. GARNER, supra note 14, at 223.
ANIMAL LIBERATION AND THE LAW
animal liberators, these numbers pale in comparison to the billions
of nonhumans used by animal enterprises each year. Thus, if one
measures the liberators' success in terms of each individual animal
who will live a better life because he or she was removed from an
animal enterprise, there have been many victories. If, however, one
assesses achievement by comparing the percentage of animals
freed to the number of animals killed annually by animal industry,
the results are sobering.' 8
B. Impact on the Public: Education
The animal liberators' education campaign has also realized
some success. Activists remove research data, documents, and vide-
otapes from animal facilities and then give these items to above-
ground animal rights groups to publicize. 8 ' This illegally obtained
information has generated a substantial amount of media publicity
and exposed instances of cruelty to animals. 90 In addition to help-
ing the public become more cognizant of the character of animal
use by industry, information gathered by animal liberators has oc-
casionally served as a catalyst for increased scrutiny of animal
enterprises.
One such instance in which the fruits of direct action exposed
activities at a particular laboratory involved a raid at the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Head Injury Clinic. In May 1984, members of
the Animal Liberation Front broke into experimenter Thomas
Gennarelli's laboratory. During the raid, the liberators caused ap-
proximately $20,000 in damage and stole 60 hours of videotapes.' 91
The stolen recordings were used by People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals (PETA) to create Unnecessary Fuss, a
videotape documenting the treatment of the animals in the labora-
tory.19 2 The footage from Unnecessary Fuss shows experimenters
placing inadequately anesthetized baboons in vices where their
heads were then smashed with a device. The film also shows the
experimenters "mocking the injured animals, flopping dazed pri-
mates around a table, and taunting an injured primate to shake
188. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text (providing a summary of the number
of animals used in the United States each year).
189. JusTicE REPORT, supra note 36, at 7; PETA, History of Liberation, supra note 55.
190. For discussion regarding the importance of media as a tool for the animal rights
movement, see GARNER, supra note 14, at 221 ("[T]he use of more and more extreme and
larger-scale actions may well have been a product of the declining media interest in the
more minor acts of damage to property."); RYD r, ANIMAL REVOLUTION, supra note 14, at
287-88 (addressing the impact of the media on direct action in Britain).
191. PETA, History of Liberation, supra note 55.




Gennarelli's experiments were funded by $14 million in tax-
payer dollars and spanned approximately thirteen years.19 4 In
1985, the National Institutes of Health terminated funding for the
experiments and shut down the lab as a result of public outcry.191
It has been claimed that direct action has caused several other
modifications at animal research facilities. Rik Scarce, author of
Eco- Warriors, explains:
Federal funds for the City of Hope National Medical Center in California
were also cut after evidence from another 1984 raid showed numerous im-
proprieties. An arson attack in 1989 against a University of Arizona animal
research laboratory caused $100,000 in damage to two buildings, and activ-
ists freed nearly 1,100 mice, rats, rabbits, guinea pigs, and frogs. Subse-
quently, the University was reported by some to have given up research on
primates.
19 1
Though not every incident of direct action results in the cessation
of research, it appears that some of the animal liberators' efforts
have provided a foundation of data upon which lawful animal
rights organizations may base their campaigns, educate the public,
and apply pressure on animal facilities.
This information-gathering role is particularly important be-
cause above ground animal advocates are often barred from ob-
taining such incriminating information via lawful means. Activists
may collect some data regarding the care and treatment of labora-
tory animals through the use of Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) requests under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).19 7
The FOIA, however, encompasses only documents, and the con-
tents may be highly censored. Under this statute, activists may
lawfully be denied access to information that is (1) commercial or
financial and privileged or confidential, (2) an inter- or intra-
agency communication, (3) personal in nature, (4) part of an open
law enforcement investigation, or (5) otherwise exempt from public
disclosure.19 8 Further, responses may take months or even years.
193. Thomas, supra note 95, at 733.
194. Id.
195. FiNSEN & FINSEN, supra note 12, at 67-71. Gennarelli's laboratory was reopened in
1992. Gennarelli Hasn't Stopped: Neither Have We', ACTIVATOR (Am. Anti.Vivisection
Soc'y, Jenkintown, Pa.), Feb. 1995, at 3. For additional background regarding the head in-
jury scandal, see FINSEN & FINSEN, supra note 12, at 67-71; Robert Weil, Inhuman Bondage,
OMm, Nov. 1986, at 65.
196. SCARCE, supra note 35, at 127.
197. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1995).
198. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b); see, e.g., Letter from Dale K. Hall for Cheryl A. Oswalt, Free-
dom of Information Act Officer, the United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and
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Finally, even this incomplete and tardy information cannot be ob-
tained about private animal enterprises, which are not subject to
the federal Freedom of Information Act and similar state statutes.
Thus, liberators' unlawful tactics may occasionally fill a void cre-
ated by insufficient public disclosure laws.
C. Impact on Animal Enterprises: Economic Sabotage
It appears that the liberators' campaign of economic sabotage
is a potent device against animal industry. Direct action has
caused significant expense to animal enterprises.19 9 These losses
are estimated by United States animal industry to total $100
million.00
Animal facility losses from a single instance of direct action
can range from hundreds to millions of dollars.20 1 The most costly
direct action incident to date involved an arson attack at an
animal diagnostic laboratory that was under construction at the
University of California, Davis in 1987.202 Damage estimates for
the incident have ranged from $3.520s to $4.5 million.20 4 Since 1977,
there have been at least twenty-one acts of major property damage
for which estimated direct costs exceeded $10,000.205
Each act of economic sabotage involves a variety of direct and
indirect costs to the targeted animal enterprise. Expenses include
repair and replacement costs for damaged equipment. Animal fa-
cilities must also purchase new animals to replace those taken by
liberators.20 6 Further, direct action often causes financial losses due
to delays in work.20 7 Direct action may also be a catalyst for long
term costs to animal enterprises. These collateral effects can in-
Plant Health Inspection Service, to Laura Knaiz [sic], Student [sic] of Law for Animal
Rights (March 28, 1994) (on file with author ! (withholding documents concerning animal
research activities at the University at Buffalo because they (1) named an animal supplier,
(2) related to a law enforcement investigation, and (3) were voluntarily provided to APHIS
and are not customarily provided to the public); Letter from Dale K. Hall for Cheryl A.
Oswalt, Freedom of Information Act Officer, the United States Department of Agriculture,
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, to Laura Knaiz [sic], Students of Law for
Animal Rights (Feb. 17, 1995) (on file with author) (withholding information about research
on animals at the University at Buffalo which was personal in nature and part of an open
law enforcement investigation).
199. JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 36, at 21-23, 31-32.
200. Act of July 27, 1992, Pub. L. 102-346, U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) 823.
201. JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 36, at 21-23.
202. Id. at 31.
203. PETA, History of Liberation, supra note 55.
204. JusTiCE REPORT, supra note 36, at 31.
205. Id. at 31-32.
206. Id. at 21.
207. Id. at 22.
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elude the expense of extra security and surveillance,20 higher in-
surance premiums, and temporary losses of revenue if the animal
facility closes for repairs.209 Finally, indirect costs from animal lib-
eration activities may include such intangible harms as decreased
employee morale.210
In sum, liberators appear to be having some success in fulfil-
ling their three-pronged agenda. Animals are being freed, the pub-
lic is becoming informed, and animal enterprises are experiencing
economic losses. Nonetheless, one must also assess the effect direct
action has had on the animal protection movement as a whole.
D. Impact on the Animal Protection Movement: Help or
Hindrance?
It is unclear whether direct action ultimately helps or harms
the bargaining position of law-abiding animal protectors. On the
one hand, the more extreme activities of animal liberators may
make animal welfarists and animal rights activists appear moder-
ate and reasonable. This contrast may enhance the bargaining po-
sition of lawful animal protectors who can claim that if some of
their objectives are not met, escalation in direct action is likely.21'
Direct action, however, could also have a negative impact on
law-abiding animal protection efforts. Debates over the use of ille-
gal techniques have caused a schism in the animal protection
movement. Some activists argue that direct action paints the whole
movement as a terrorist effort.212 For example, the position of
Joyce Tischler, Executive Director of the Animal Legal Defense
Fund, has been described as follows:
Tischler fears the ALF's violent tactics could destroy the animal rights
movement by undermining public support. She points to Britain, where she
feels underground tactics have given the movement a bad name. She notes
that many people have come to associate the entire movement with violence
and extremists, and hopes the prominent animal rights and welfare organi-
zations will dissociate themselves from ALF tactics.
2 13
Some activists also feel that direct action diverts attention away
208. Animal industries estimate that liberator activities have caused security costs to
rise 10% to 20%. Id. at 22.
209. Id. at 22.
210. Id. at 21-23.
211. GARNER, supra note 14, at 226; see also MANES, supra note 42, at 18, 187-88 (mak-
ing a similar argument in the context of lawful ecological activism and eco-sabotage).
212. ALF, OPPOSING VmwpoiTs, supra note 182, at 206, 209; GARNER, supra note 14, at
221-22; JASPER & NELKIN, supra note 13, at 37, 49-51; SCARCE, supra note 35, at 126.
213. JASPER & NELKIN, supra note 13, at 37.
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from the issue of animal protection to the nature of the direct ac-
tion activities themselves. These law-abiding advocates worry that
the public may "switch sympathy for the animals... to the animal
abusers.
214
Despite these fears, there does not appear to be epidemic pub-
lic disapproval of direct action or substantial impediment of lawful
animal protection efforts. The Animal Liberation Front has a sup-
port group with 10,000 paying members 215 and the animal protec-
tion movement as a whole continues to expand.21 s Despite these
trends, there has been substantial backlash against animal libera-
tors from government and animal industries.
V. BACKLASH
We reserve the use [of the words 'terrorism' and 'terrorist'] in practice for
politically motivated violence of which we disapprove. The words imply a
judgment about the political context in which those who we decide to call
terrorists operate, and above all about the nature of the regime under which
and against which they operate. We imply that the regime itself is legiti-
mate. If we call them 'freedom fighters' we imply that the regime is
illegitimate.
2 17
With the support of animal industry, state and federal govern-
ments have initiated a backlash response to direct action. Tactics
used to impede animal liberators include prosecutions under tradi-
tional criminal statutes, the enactment of federal and state laws
specifically designed to thwart direct action, the impaneling of nu-
merous grand juries, and the likely use of the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act.
2 8
214. GARNER, supra note 14, at 225 (quoting Lorraine Kay from AV MAGAZINE, May
1991, at 12). This argument has also been raised within the radical environmental move-
ment in regards to monkeywrenching, or ecosabotage. One environmental activist responds
to this critique by arguing:
History informs us that direct action engenders as much support as opposition.
The American Revolution saw as many colonists enter the Troy ranks as enlisted
in the Continental Army. During the Second World War, as many Frenchmen
joined Nazi forces as participated in the famous French Underground. The major-
ity of the public floats non-committally between conflicting forces.
Dave Forman & T.O. Hellenbach, Earth First., in THE GREEN READER: ESSAYS TOWARD A
SUSTAINABLE SocImTY 229 (Andrew Dobson ed., 1991).
215. JASPER & NELKIN, supra note 13, at 34.
216. FINSEN & FINSEN, supra note 12, at 257-58.
217. THE ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS AND POLICY BOOK: PHILOSOPHY, ECOLOGY AND ECO-
NOMICS 601-02 (Donald VanDeVeer & Christine Pierce eds., 1994) (citing Bat-Ami Bar On,
Why Terrorism Is Morally Problematic, in FEMINIST ETHICS 109 (Claudia Card ed., 1991)).
218. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1984 & Supp. 1994).
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A. State Criminal Prosecutions
It is unclear exactly how many persons have been prosecuted
for animal liberation activities. The Justice Report notes that in
the United States,219 nine persons have been convicted in connec-
tion with a specific animal liberation incident.22 0 In contrast, au-
thor Rik Scarce writes that as of 1990, only four persons have been
219. Animal liberators have also been convicted for direct action incidents in Britain.
RYDER, ANIMAL REVOLUTION supra note 14, at 273-74, 276-77; SCARCE, supra note 35, at 141.
220. JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 36, at 24. According to the Department of Justice,
these nine convictions arose from the following incidents:
(1)Fran Stephanie Trutt pleaded guilty to state and federal charges for her No-
vember 1, 1988 bombing attempt at U.S. Surgical Corporation. Trutt targeted
U.S. Surgical because it uses hundreds of live dogs each year to train doctors and
salespersons in the use of the surgical staplers it manufactures. The trainees prac-
tice by stapling multiple surgical incisions on dogs who are then killed. For further
information on the Trutt case, see supra note 56.
(2)Roger Troen was convicted of first degree theft, second degree burglary, and
conspiracy to commit burglary in the second degree for his participation in the
October 26, 1986 break-in and theft at the University of Oregon breeding facility
in Eugene, Oregon. Approximately $50,000 in damage was done to the facility and
264 animals were released. The Animal Liberation Front claimed responsibility for
this incident. Oregon v. Troen, 786 P.2d 751, 752 n.1 (Or. Ct. App. 1990), review
denied, 801 P.2d 841 (Or. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1232 (1991); PETA, His-
tory of Liberation, supra note 55. For additional information on this conviction
see discussion infra part V.A.2.b.
(3)John P. Goodwin, Michael S. Karbon, and Jessie Keenan were convicted of
misdemeanors for vandalizing several fur shops in Memphis, Tennessee. On May
18, 1993, these defendants were each sentenced to 11 months, 29 days imprison-
ment for their guilty pleas to four counts of vandalism under $500. The Vegan
Front claimed responsibility for the incidents. See MARQUARDT, supra note 37, at
161; Lawrence Buser, "Payday" Arrives for 3 Sent to Prison, CoM. APPEAL, May
18, 1993, at B1; Lawrence Buser, Three Face Jail, Fines in Anti-Fur Vandalism,
Com. APPEAL, reprinted in OUT OF THE CAGES!, Fall 1993, at 13.
(4)Chris DeRose and Aaron Leider were sentenced to ninety days in jail for the
April 21, 1988 break-in at the UCLA Brain Research Institute. The Los Angeles
Times reported that as a result of this direct action, "videotapes and photographs
of cats with electrodes implanted in their heads and spines were smuggled out and
publicized ... ." Kathleen Hendrix, The Unbridled Activist: In Chris DeRose's
World, Animal Studies Are Inhuman - and He'll Do Most Anything to Stop
Them, L.A. TImEs, Aug. 31, 1988, pt. V at 1.
(5)Two activists pleaded no contest to charges of burglary and possession of stolen
property. This prosecution arose from the December 9, 1984, break-in and theft at
the City of Hope Research Institute and Medical Center in Duarte, California.
During this break-in, 115 animals were released and $400,000-$500,000 in research
was disrupted. The two defendants were fined $10,000 each. See JUSTICE REPORT,
supra note 36, at 31; PETA, History of Liberation, supra note 55.
Telephone Interview with Scott Hendley, Esq., U.S. Dep't of Justice (Nov. 12, 1993).
Since the date of this report, activist Rodney Coronado pleaded guilty to federal
charges pertaining to direct action. For a synopsis of this case, see infra notes 337-343.
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convicted for animal liberation activities.221 In fact, the precise
number of persons convicted for direct action in the United States
may be difficult to ascertain because many of these cases involve
misdemeanors for which it is difficult to obtain comprehensive
data. By all accounts, however, relatively few persons have been
convicted for direct action. This section will look at two state
cases, Hawaii v. LeVasseur222 and Oregon v. Troen.223 Levasseur
and Troen are the only reported animal liberation cases to reach
an appellate court. In each case, the defendants unsuccessfully at-
tempted to introduce a choice of evils defense.
1. The Choice of Evils Defense
The choice of evils defense, also known as necessity or lesser
evils, 224 sets forth that an otherwise criminal act was correct be-
havior under the circumstances because it was done to avoid a
greater harm. Thus, necessity is a type of justification defense. 225
Necessity is a common-law defense in some jurisdictions while
in others it has been codified. Generally, a successful necessity de-
fense requires some specified combination of the following
elements:
(1) the criminal action was taken to avoid a grave harm; (2) the harm to be
avoided was imminent; (3) there was no available legal alternative; (4) the
harm to be avoided was greater than the harm caused by the criminal act;
(5) it was reasonable for the actor to believe that his criminal act would,
avert the threatened harm;226
and (6) the actor was not personally at fault in creating the situa-
tion calling for the necessity of choosing between two evils.227 The
221. Scarce reports that other than Fran Trutt, only three people have been arrested
for animal liberation activities. He states that all of these activists were found with liberated
rabbits in their possession and all received fines. SCARCE, supra note 35, at 136.
222. 613 P.2d 1328 (Haw. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1018 (1980).
223. 786 P.2a 751 (Or. Ct. App.), review denied, 801 P.2d 841 (Or. 1990), cert. denied,
501 U.S. 1232 (1991).
224. The terms choice of evils, necessity, and lesser evils will be used interchangeably.
225. 1 PAUL H. RoBINSoN, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 24(a), at 83 (1984). Other neces-
sity defenses include self defense, defense of others, defense of property, and public author-
ity defenses. 1 Id. at 83-85. A justification defense differs from a defense of excuse. Excuses
admit that the action may be wrong, but argue the actor should be forgiven because he
suffered from a condition making him not responsible for his deed. Such excusing conditions
may include insanity, intoxication, immaturity, or an involuntary act defense (e.g., reflex
action or convulsion). 1 Id. § 25, at 91-93.
226. James 0. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, "Choice of Evils," Necessity, Duress, or Simi-
lar Defense to State or Local Criminal Charges Based on Acts of Public Protest, 3
A.L.R.5TH 521 § 2a (1993).
227. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AUSTIN W. ScoTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 5.4(d) (2d ed. 1986).
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necessity defense may be barred if one or more of these elements is
not met or if there is an apparent legislative intent to preclude use
of the defense in the situation at issue.228
Defendants engaging in a wide variety of protests have at-
tempted to use the necessity defense. Activists challenging cruelty
to animals,229 nuclear power, nuclear weapons, abortion, the Viet-
nam war, United States policy in Central America, investments in
corporations doing business in South Africa, reduced funding for
AIDS research, harmful logging practices, substandard prison con-
ditions, and other issues have all attempted to raise necessity. 2 0
Though most courts have denied activists the opportunity to intro-
See also ROBINSON, supra note 225, § 124.
228. LAFAv & Scorr, supra note 227; Pearson, supra note 226.
229. Animal rights activists engaging in public civil disobedience have unsuccessfully
attempted to present the necessity defense. For instance, in United States v. Allen, defend-
ants appealed their convictions for unlawfully entering a military base in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1382. The defendants claimed the district court erred when it denied them the
opportunity to present the necessity defense to the jury. United States v. Allen, Nos. 90-
10400, 90-10550, 90-10551, 90-10552, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 18368, *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 5,
1991) (may not be cited to or by the courts of the 9th Circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.
R. 36-3).
In this case, the defendants held placards and stood outside the Letterman Army Insti-
tute (Letterman) to demonstrate their opposition to an experiment in which nineteen stolen
greyhound dogs were to be used for research. Id. at *2. For the experiment, the dogs were to
have a piece of bone from their forelegs replaced by a synthetic compound. After a healing
period, the dogs were to be euthanized. Joanne Anderson, Cruelty to Greyhounds, NEWSDAY,
Oct. 10, 1989, at 59; Molly Moore, Sale of Dogs for Army Experiment Probed: More Than a
Dozen Greyhounds Were Obtained for Research Without Owners' Approval, WASH. PosT,
Oct. 9, 1989, at El.
Prior to their unlawful entry, the defendants attempted to obtain information from mil-
itary officials at Letterman, contacted local and national political leaders, and participated
in numerous lawful demonstrations. In addition, Representative Barbara Boxer wrote a let-
ter to the Army demanding the experiment be canceled because there was no evidence it
was medically or scientifically valid and because it would cause needless suffering to the
dogs. Only after the activists' participation in civil disobedience, did Letterman release the
serial numbers of the dogs. This information eventually led to the dogs' return to their
owners. According to newspaper reports, this controversy also prompted federal investiga-
tions into the way the Army obtained the dogs and a review of the planned experiments.
Allen, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 18368 at *1-2; Barbara Boxer Urges the Army to Cancel
Presidio Test on Dogs, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 4, 1989, at A9; Moore, supra, at El.
Despite the activists' various efforts and the ultimate release of the dogs' serial num-
bers, the district court held the defendants could not assert the necessity defense because
they "(1) failed to show that the entry into the Presidio led to the cessation of the research,
and (2) did not pursue alternative legal options available, including seeking permission for
the demonstration." Allen, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 18368 at *3. The appellate court affirmed
the lower court's decision adding that the "defendants failed to demonstrate that a lawsuit
against the Government was not a viable alternative." Id. at *5. The Ninth Circuit failed to
address how the activists would have been able to establish standing to bring suit.
230. Pearson, supra note 226, at 521 §§ 3-22; See also Creative Defenses in Civil Diso-
bedience Cases, 42 GUMD PRAC. 97 (1985).
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duce these claims, a few have permitted the defense.2 3 '
In cases involving political protest, it has been argued that al-
lowing activists to submit necessity claims to the jury serves im-
portant constitutional and policy functions. First, the opportunity
to argue necessity ensures deendants' due process rights to put on
a defense. Second, it preserves activists' rights to be judged by
their peers and have a jury determine questions of fact such as
reasonableness and credibility.23 2 Finally, the application of neces-
sity to cases of political protest may present an opportunity for the
defendant to empower himself politically, empower a cross section
of the community (i.e., the jury), and increase the quantity and
quality of public discourse on a controversial issue.233
Analysis of Hawaii v. LeVasseur 3 4 and Oregon v. Troen23 5 il-
lustrates how criminal prosecutions and rejection of the necessity
defense have been used to thwart animal activists. Proper applica-
tion of the necessity defense in these cases would have enabled
these animal liberators to submit their claims to the jury.
231. See, e.g., New York v. Gray, 571 N.Y.S.2d 851 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1991) (allowing the
defendants to assert the necessity defense in a case involving public protest of policies alleg-
edly increasing vehicular pollution); New York v. Archer, 537 N.Y.S.2d 726 (N.Y. City Ct.
1988) (holding defendants could present evidence concerning necessity if they first estab-
lished that a hospital was performing second or third trimester abortions).
The necessity defense has also been permitted in situations not arising from political
protest. LAFAvE & ScoTT, supra note 227, at § 5.4(c); See, e.g., People v. Lovercamp, 118
Cal. Rptr. 110 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (finding that defendant's offer of proof concerning the
alleged necessity of her prison escape was sufficient to create a question of fact to be deter-
mined by the jury); People v. Pena, 197 Cal. Rptr. 264 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1983)
(stating that the defense of necessity was available to appellant convicted for driving under
the influence of intoxicating liquor); Jenks v. Florida, 582 So.2d 676 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1991) (concluding that the trial court erred in refusing to recognize the defense of medical
necessity for a person with AIDS convicted of cultivation of marijuana and possession of
drug paraphernalia); State v. Hastings, 801 P.2d 563 (Idaho 1990) (holding that the defend-
ant was entitled to present evidence at trial on the common law defense of medical neces-
sity); New Jersey v. Tate, 486 A.2d 12S1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984) (permitting de-
fendant with quadriplegia to present evidence to establish that he possessed marijuana to
ease the pain caused by spasticity associated with his disability).
232. Laura J. Schulkind, Note, Applying the Necessity Defense to Civil Disobedience
Cases, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 79, 85-89 (1989).
233. Steven M. Bauer & Peter J. Eckerstrom, Note, The State Made Me Do It: The
Applicability of the Necessity Defense to Civil Disobedience, 39 STANFORD L. REV. 1173,
1184-89 (1987).
234. 613 P.2d 1328 (Haw. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1018 (1980).
235. 786 P.2d 751 (Or. Ct. App.), review denied, 801 P.2d 841 (Or. 1990), cert. denied,
501 U.S. 1232 (1991).
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2. Rejection of the Choice of Evils Defense
a. Hawaii v. LeVasseur
Hawaii v. LeVasseur238 involved the first recorded animal lib-
eration incident in the United States.37 Kenneth LeVasseur was
an undergraduate research assistant at a University of Hawaii In-
stitute of Marine Biology laboratory in Kewalo Basin, Honolulu.
LeVasseur fed, swam with, and cleaned the tanks of Kea and
Puka, two Atlantic bottle-nose dolphins being studied at the labo-
ratory. In May 1977, without the university's permission, LeVas-
seur and several accomplices removed Kea and Puka from their
tanks and transported the dolphins to a bay approximately fifty
miles from the laboratory. The dolphins were then released into
the ocean. 3 ' When the dolphins were freed, a message was left at
the laboratory identifying the activists as the Undersea
Railroad.
239
LeVasseur was prosecuted for this direct action under Ha-
waii's criminal code for theft in the first degree.240 At trial, LeVas-
seur attempted to assert the choice of evils defense - i.e., the evil
of keeping the dolphins captive in an allegedly substandard labora-
tory was a greater harm than the crime of theft. The trial court
disallowed LeVasseur's defense and subsequently convicted him of
first degree theft.241
Gavan Daws, author of "Animal Liberation" as Crime, ex-
plains LeVasseur's motive in rescuing the dolphins:
[Defense counsel spoke of the] bad and rapidly deteriorating physical condi-
tions at the laboratory; a punishing regimen for the dolphins, involving
236. 613 P.2d 1328.
237. PETA, History of Liberation, supra note 55; Letter from Sheila F. Anthony, Assis-
tant Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice, and Eugene Branstool, Assistant Secretary,
Marketing and Inspection Services, U.S. Dep't of Agric., to Thomas S. Foley, Speaker of the
House of Representatives 1 (Sept. 2, 1993) (on file with author).
238. 613 P.2d at 1330-31. Approximately four or five others helped LeVasseur free the
dolphins. Id. at 1331. The only named accomplice was Steven Charles Sipman, who was
tried separately and convicted. He was sentenced to five years probation, required to spend
500 hours in community service, and ordered to pay the state the value of the dolphins.
Value of 2 Dolphins, supra note 186, at A14.
239. Gavan Daws, "Animal Liberation" as Crime: The Hawaii Dolphin Case, in ETHIcs
AND ANmmALs 361, 362 (Harlan B. Miller & William H. Williams eds., 1983). LeVasseur and
Sipman held a press conference after the liberation exposing the dolphins' release. Gavan
Daws, The Hawaii Dolphin Case: Animal Liberation in Criminal Court, ANIMALS' AGENDA,
March 1980, reprinted in Our Back Pages, ANIMALs' AGENDA, Vol. 15, no. 2, at 12. In con-
trast, most modern liberators do not reveal their identities. JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 36,
at 6.
240. 613 P.2d at 1330 (citing HAw. REV. STAT. § 708-831(1)(b)).
241. 613 P.2d at 1330, 1332.
808 [Vol. 43
ANIMAL LIBERATION AND THE LAW
overwork, reductions in their food rations, the total isolation they endured,
deprived of the company of other dolphins . . . to the point where Puka,
having refused to take part consistently in experimental sessions, developed
self-destructive behaviors symptomatic of deep disturbance, and finally be-
came lethargic, 'comatose.' LeVasseur, seeing this, fearing that death would
be the outcome, and knowing that there was no law he could turn to, be-
lieved himself authorized, in the interest of the dolphins' well-being, to re-
lease them.
24 2
Thus, LeVasseur's decision to free the dolphins stemmed from his
knowledge of their deteriorating physical and mental health.
It appears that LeVasseur's beliefs about the laboratory's in-
adequacies were well founded. A report executed pursuant to an
inspection under the Marine Mammal Protection Act 245 stated that
the laboratory should not receive new dolphins until "extensive re-
pairs [have] been done" to the facility.244 The standards under
which the laboratory was inspected were not applicable to the con-
ditions under which Kea and Puka were kept since they were cap-
tured prior to the Act and therefore were not within the scope of
its coverage.2 45
Despite the conditions at the laboratory and the dolphins'
poor health, trial judge Masato Doi blocked LeVasseur's choice of
evils defense. LeVasseur was sentenced to five years probation with
the condition that he serve six months in jail.246 He appealed this
decision to the Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals raising as
error the lower court decision regarding the choice of evils de-
fense.247 On review, the intermediate court of appeals analyzed the
applicability of the choice of evils defense to LeVasseur. The Ha-
waii choice of evils statute specifies that, unless the criminal code
provides otherwise, illegal activity may be justified if (1) it is done
to avoid a greater harm to another; (2) the actor is not negligent or
reckless in appraising the necessity for his conduct; and (3) as a
242. Daws, supra note 239, at 366-67.
243. 16 U.S.C. § 1417 (Supp. V 1994); Appellant's Opening Brief at 16, Hawaii v.
LeVasseur, 613 P.2d 1328 (Haw. Ct. App. 1980) (No. 6930).
244. Appellant's Opening Brief at 16, LeVasseur (No. 6930).
245. Id.
246. 613 P.2d at 1335.
247. Appellant's Opening Brief at 11-23, LeVasseur (No. 6930). LeVasseur also argued
that (1) the trial court abused its discretion by limiting his counsel's voir dire of the jury; (2)
the advancement of his trial date by the trial court deprived him of his Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel; (3) he was denied a fair trial because his cross exami-
nation was unduly limited; (4) he was denied an impartial tribunal; (5) the trial court denied
him the right to compulsory process; (6) the rejection of corroborating testimony regarding
the deteriorated conditions at the laboratory was reversible error; (7) the jury instructions
were erroneous; and, (8) his sentence was unduly harsh. Id. at 23-62. The appellate court
found each of LeVasseur's claims to be without merit. LeVasseur, 613 P.2d at 1331-35.
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matter of law, the evil the actor seeks to avoid is a greater harm
than the offense the actor commits 4 8 In LeVasseur, the appellate
court addressed each of these elements in turn.
Looking to the legislature's definition of another, the interme-
diate court of appeals found that this term did not include dol-
phins. Another was defined by the Hawaii legislature as "any other
person and includes, where relevant, the United States, this State
and any of its political subdivisions, and any other state and any of
its political subdivisions."2419 Since the dolphins were neither a
state nor a political subdivision, they could only satisfy the defini-
tion of another if they were persons under the law. The Hawaii
legislature had defined person as a natural person, a corporation,
or an unincorporated association.5 Using these statutory defini-
tions, the court found that dolphins were neither a person nor an-
other whom the choice of evils defense was meant to protect.
2 1
Alternatively, LeVasseur argued that by releasing Kea and
Puka, he was protecting the United States from harm or evil. The
defendant claimed that one of the purposes of the Animal Welfare
Act was to protect the well-being of laboratory animals such as
Kea and Puka. LeVasseur argued that because its law was not be-
ing properly administered, the United States was suffering a
harm.252 By stealing the dolphins, LeVasseur explained, he was
able to defend the United States and enforce its policy of animal
welfare.2 "5  The intermediate court of appeals agreed that the
Animal Welfare Act and its regulations manifested a national pol-
248. The Hawaii choice of evils statute provides:
(1) Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid an imminent harm
or evil to himself or to another is justifiable provided that:
(a) The harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater
than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense
charged; and
(b) Neither the Code nor other law defining the offense provides excep-
tions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved; and
(c) A legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not
otherwise plainly appear.
(2) When the actor was reckless or negligent in bringing about the situation re-
quiring a choice of harms or evils or in appraising the necessity for his conduct,
the justification afforded by this section is unavailable in a prosecution for any
offense for which recklessness or negligence, as the case may be suffices to estab-
lish culpability.
Id. at 1332-33 (reproducing HAw. REV. STAT. § 703-302).
249. Id. at 1333 (reprinting HAw. REV. STAT. § 701-118(8) (1985)) (emphasis added).
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icy to protect the well-being of these laboratory animals.254 The
court concluded that a violation of this statutory purpose would
constitute a harm or evil to the United States, another under Ha-
waii's choice of evils law.
255
Next, the court considered whether LeVasseur "recklessly or
negligently appraise[d] the necessity for his conduct" when he lib-
erated Kea and Puka. If he was found to have recklessly or negli-
gently examined the necessity, LeVasseur could not have invoked
the choice of evils defense. The intermediate court of appeals re-
counted that LeVasseur began researching the release of the dol-
phins a year before he removed them. The court also noted that
LeVasseur failed to contact the government and report the alleg-
edly life threatening conditions at the laboratory. Though the
court reviewed other options it believed were available to LeVas-
seur, its discussion fell short of determining that LeVasseur acted
recklessly or negligently when he released the dolphins.2 56 Rather,
the court held that LeVasseur's defense failed because, as a matter
of law, the evil of theft was at least as great a harm as a life threat-
ening violation of the Animal Welfare Act.
257
Most courts, like Hawaii's appellate court, have denied activ-
ists the opportunity to introduce their claims of necessity as a mat-
ter of law. Some commentators have argued, however, that ques-
tions of competing values should be treated as questions of fact, or
mixed law and fact, to be decided by the jury. Edward B. Arnolds
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. If the intermediate court had found against the defendant on this issue of negli-
gence or recklessness, one could argue that this decision would be in error. LeVasseur, as
well as the other people at the laboratory, had been able to observe the dolphins' deteriorat-
ing health and abysmal laboratory conditions over an extended period of time. Nonetheless,
it seemed that no one at the laboratory was inclined or able to shield the dolphins from
harm. Despite the significant laboratory inadequacies, no repairs were anticipated at the
facility. Similarly, the Department of Agriculture had failed to ensure the dolphins' well-
being. The agency neither confiscated the dolphins nor imposed adequate sanctions to spur
improvements. Consequently, it appears that LeVasseur may have reasonably appraised the
necessity for his conduct when he saw that neither the laboratory's self-monitoring nor the
Department of Agriculture's enforcement powers provided effective protection to the dol-
phins. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 11-16, LeVasseur (No. 6930).
It has been argued that when the necessity defense is at issue, questions regarding the
opportunity for legal alternatives should consider more than mere availability; they should
address effectiveness as well. Bauer & Eckerstrom, supra note 233, at 1179-80; Schulkind,
supra note 232, at 91-93. While the availability of legal options would, therefore, be relevant
to an inquiry into the reasonableness of LeVasseur's beliefs and actions, the existence of
lawful options should not entirely usurp a factual inquiry into the effectiveness of those
alternatives.




and Norman F. Garland, authors of The Defense of Necessity In
Criminal Law, explain:
Theoretically, submitting the value issue to the jury would be in keeping
with the concept of trial by jury. Where activity falls within the "penum-
bra" of the law or where disagreement exists in a society about a moral issue
... there seems to be little reason why a defendant should not be allowed in
the first instance to have the jury as the "conscience of the community" and
his peers decide whether he made an objectively correct choice of values. If
the jury decides in the defendant's favor, he is vindicated. If the jury votes
to convict, the defendant still has a right to appeal their decision.25 8
LeVasseur involved just such an instance of competing values.
Nonetheless, the LeVasseur court held that as a matter of law, a
life-threatening violation of the Animal Welfare Act was a less sig-
nificant evil than the release of the ill animals. The intermediate
court of appeals should have submitted the defense to the jurors
and allowed them, as representatives of the community, to weigh
the competing interests and determine whether LeVasseur's ac-
tions were justified.
b. Oregon v. Troen
Only one other reported appellate case involves the criminal
prosecution of an animal liberator. In Oregon v. Troen,259 Roger
Troen, a fifty-seven year old former elementary school teacher,
participated in a break-in at a University of Oregon psychology de-
partment laboratory. While he did not personally break into the
laboratory, Troen drove a get-away car carrying monkeys, rabbits,
hamsters and rats from the laboratory. He also helped find homes
for the approximately 125 liberated animals.2 60 Like LeVasseur,
Troen attempted to introduce a choice of evils defense to prove his
actions were justified.
In support of his choice of evils defense, Troen sought to ad-
mit graphic photographic and videotaped evidence of animal abuse
in laboratories.2 61 During a pretrial motion, the trial court sup-
258. Edward B. Arnolds & Norman F. Garland, The Defense of Necessity in Criminal
Law: The Right to Choose the Lesser Evil, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 289, 296 (1974).
259. 786 P.2d 751 (Or. Ct. App.), review denied, 801 P.2d 841 (Or. 1990), cert. denied,
501 U.S. 1232 (1991).
260. Ann Portal, Activist Gets Fine of $34,900, REG.-GUARD, Mar. 24, 1988, at 1A, 4A;
Ethan Rarick, Animal Rights Activist Gets Five Years Probation, UPI, Mar. 24, 1988, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWS File, WIRES subfile. The October 1986 break-in and
theft caused damage to the university in excess of $50,000. JusTICE REPORT, supra note 36,
at 32.
261. 786 P.2d at 753.
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pressed this proffered evidence and held that the choice of evils
defense was inappropriate to Troen's defense. 2 The Lane County
Circuit Court ultimately convicted Troen of first degree theft, sec-
ond degree burglary, and conspiracy to commit burglary in the sec-
ond degree. 263 He was sentenced to five years probation with vari-
ous conditions2 4 and ordered to pay $34,912.96 in restitution.265
Troen appealed his conviction to the Oregon Court of Appeals
on two grounds. First, he claimed as error the granting of the
state's pretrial motion to limit evidence in support of his proposed
choice of evils defense.266 Speaking for the court of appeals, Judge
Graber explained that a trial court could properly rule on the ad-
missibility of evidence during-a pretrial hearing only if the prof-
fered proof carries an "unusual potential for prejudice. 21  Troen
had described his proffered evidence as "graphic photographic evi-
dence of research practices and abuses, [and] graphic video-taped
documentaries of other similar research practices and animal
abuses. 26 8 The court of appeals found that this proffered evidence
had an unusual potential for prejudice.269 Consequently, Judge
Graber held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
ruled on the admissability of the evidence during a pretrial
hearing.2
70
The court of appeals never addressed the substance of the
trial court's ruling. The court of appeals should have considered
that, in cases like Troen's, the prejudicial effect of graphic evi-
dence relates to its probative value. While in many cases, graphic
evidence is irrelevant to the issue at hand, in this case the graphic
evidence was vitally related to Troen's necessity defense. That is,
the nature and extent of animal suffering in the laboratory was
relevant to the issue of whether Troen reasonably believed that il-
legal intervention was warranted. Troen's evidence would have
provided essential corroboration for his beliefs and been invaluable
in his attempts to persuade a jury that his acts were justified.
Thus, the Troen court improperly applied the relevancy balancing
262. Id. at 752.
263. Id. at 752 n.1.
264. Portal, supra note 260, at IA. Troen was required to complete 90 days of home
detention and have his movement monitored via an electronic ankle bracelet. He was also
ordered to abstain from associating with his accomplices from the, break-in and to perform
250 hours of community service. Id.
265. Sentence and Order of Probation, Troen (No. 10-87-03558).
266. 786 P.2d at 752.







Troen also appealed the trial court's decision that his prof-
fered choice of evils defense was legally insufficient to warrant jury
submission. On review, the appellate court explained that the
choice of evils defense could be submitted to a jury only if the de-
fendant's evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that "(1) the
defendant's conduct was necessary to avoid a threatened injury; (2)
the threatened injury was imminent; and, (3) it was reasonable for
the defendant to believe that the need to avoid that injury was
greater than the need to avoid the injury that the charging statute
seeks to prevent.I' 1 Troen argued that he had met his burden
with the requisite degree of persuasiveness; the court of appeals
disagreed. Judge Graber found that the "trial court correctly un-
derstood its role" and had not held Troen to too high a
standard.
7 2
Though the Oregon court did not specify the exact quantum of
evidence it required, this standard should have been low as a mat-
ter of law .27 3 The issue of legal sufficiency in necessity cases has
been a frequent source of controversy across jurisdictions. In his
treatise, Criminal Law Defenses, author Paul Robinson cautions
that though a judge must determine whether this standard has
been met as a matter of law, "care should be taken . . . not to
preempt the jury's province where the evidence does provide a ba-
sis for a defense. '274 Similarly, it has been argued: "There is a dis-
junction.., between the low standard of production courts hearing
the necessity defense articulate in their hypothetical evidentiary
271. Id. The Oregon choice of evils statute specifies:
1. Unless inconsistent with other provisions... defining justifiable use of physical
force, or with some other provision of law, conduct which would otherwise consti-
tute an offense is justifiable and not criminal when:
a. That conduct is necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an imminent
public or private injury; and
b. The threatened injury is of such gravity that, according to ordinary stan-
dards of intelligence and morality, the desirability and urgency of avoiding the
injury clearly outweigh the desirability of avoiding the injury sought to be pre-
vented by the statute defining the offense in issue.
2. The necessity and justifiability of conduct under subsection (1) of this section
shall not rest upon considerations pertaining only to the morality and advisability
of the statute, either in its general application or with respect to its application to
a particular class of cases arising thereunder.
OR. REV. STAT. § 161.200 (1993).
272. 786 P.2d at 753.
273. Across jurisdictions, the quantum of evidence required to satisfy a defendant's
burden of production have included the following standards: some evidence, more than a
scintilla, slight evidence, evidence to support, some credible evidence, and evidence suffi-
cient to raise a reasonable doubt. 1 ROBINSON, supra note 225, § 4(c), at 35-36.
274. Id. § 4(d).
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tests, and the extraordinarily high standard which many of these
same courts ultimately impose on civil disobedients raising the ne-
cessity defense."2 7 5 It appears that the Oregon courts made one of
these all too frequent errors.
Trial Judge Edwin E. Allen commented during Troen's sen-
tencing: "'I've wondered what I would do . . . if, as a member of
the state board of education or as a legislator, I heard and saw
what I have heard and seen. Very frankly, it is disturbing to me as
a citizen of this state and this city.' ,,176 Among other things, Judge
Allen was referring to witnesses' testimony claiming that the uni-
versity's 20,000 research animals "had been routinely deprived of
veterinary care, left to die in their cages, and used in 'joke
photos.' ,,277 These comments indicate there was enough evidence
to satisfy Troen's minimal burden of production for letting his ne-
cessity defense reach the jury.
Despite its discussions regarding the suppression of prejudicial
evidence and the legal sufficiency of Troen's defense, the Oregon
Court of Appeals stated that it ultimately barred the necessity de-
fense because it was inconsistent with federal animal care regula-
tions. The court explained:
Extensive federal regulations govern the treatment of animals used in the
experiments that the laboratories were performing. For this purpose, regula-
tions authorizing conduct have the same effect as statutes authorizing con-
duct. Although defendant alleges in his brief that the laboratory that he
helped to raid was violating several federal regulations, he does not point to
any evidence in the record that would support those allegations. Accord-
ingly, federal law expressly allows what the victim of the crime was doing,
so defendant may not offer a choice of evils defense when he interfered with
that activity because of his belief that what the laboratory was doing is mor-
ally wrong.
2 7 8
Thus, the appellate court held that a defendant may not argue ne-
cessity when the evil to be avoided is allowed under federal
regulations.
275. Schulkind, supra note 232, at 89 (footnotes omitted).
276. NEwKIRK, supra note 38, at 346-47.
277. Id. at 347. Author Ingrid Newkirk describes one such joke photograph as follows:
In one such photo, the university's director of animal care appeared, a lit cigarette
dangling from his lips and a bottle of beer in one hand. In the other hand he held
up a screaming, frightened primate infant - umbilical cord still attached - pre-
tending to have just delivered him from a female student sprawled out on an oper-
ating table.
Id.
278. Oregon v. Troen, 786 P.2d 751, 753-54 (Or. Ct. App. 1990)(citation omitted), re-
view denied, 801 P.2d 841 (Or. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1232 (1991).
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Arguably, the court of appeals erred here as well. Some juris-
dictions have found that preemption is a narrow exception to the
justification defense . 7 These courts do not allow legislation in a
particular area to serve as a total bar to the necessity defense. In-
stead, they consider whether there is evidence sufficient to indicate
the legislature has weighed all possible competing harms and made
a preemptive value choice. Thus, these jurisdictions interpret the
preemption doctrine more literally. They require that the legisla-
ture specifically weigh competing harms, including those foreseen
by defendants, and make a value choice that explicitly rejects the
defendant's position. °0
While it is true that the Animal Welfare Act and community
values appear to condone some animal experimentation, they also
condemn unnecessary cruelty to animals and advance that animals
should be treated humanely. In fact, the Animal Welfare Act's con-
gressional statement of purpose includes a provision which states
that this legislation was intended "to insure that animals intended
for use in research facilities ... are provided humane care and
treatment .... ,1 Consequently, Troen's proposed choice of evils
'defense should not have been preempted if his actions were taken
to prevent cruelty to animals.
Furthermore, the court of appeals may have selectively read
the lower court's record when it found the defendant did not point
to any evidence indicating the University at Oregon laboratory was
in violation of federal regulations. Testimony at trial set forth sev-
eral potential violations, including deprivation of appropriate vet-
erinary care for the laboratory animals.2 82
In sum, it appears the court of appeals erred in many ways.
First, it failed to address the substance of the trial court's pretrial
ruling suppressing highly probative evidence. Second, it incorrectly
determined that there was no evidence in the record to support
Troen's choice of evils defense. Finally, it erred in deciding that
the defendant's direct action was preempted by federal law.
As indicated by LeVasseur and Troen, prosecutors have suc-
cessfully used traditional criminal statutes such as burglary, con-
spiracy, and theft to convict animal liberators. Though there have
been few convictions, it does not appear that this dearth results
from acquittals or any lack of effort by government and animal
enterprises in making animal liberation a law enforcement priority.
279. Schulkind, supra note 232, at 108-09.
280. Id.
281. 7 U.S.C. § 2131(1) (1988).
282. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
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In fact, as the following discussion regarding anti-liberation laws28 3
and grand jury investigations 28 4 will indicate, government is invest-
ing significant effort and resources to quell direct action.
B. Anti-Liberation Laws
As a direct response to animal liberation crimes in the United
States, Congress used its commerce power 285 to enact the Animal
Enterprise Protection Act of 1992 (AEPA)2 s8 This section will an-
alyze various aspects of the AEPA, including which actions are
criminalized under the statute, the penalties for such offenses, and
the history of the Act. Finally, this Comment will critique this
anti-liberation statute and provide information on proposed
amendments to the act.
The AEPA specifies that a person commits an offense if he or
she:
(1) travels in interstate or foreign commerce, or uses or causes to be used
the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, for the purpose of
causing physical disruption to the functioning of an animal enterprise; and
(2) intentionally causes physical disruption to the functioning of an animal
enterprise by intentionally stealing, damaging, or causing the loss of, any
property (including animals or records) used by the animal enterprise, and
thereby causes economic damage exceeding $10,000 to that enterprise, or
conspires to do so .... 
2 87
Simply put, this statute makes direct action by animal liberators a
federal crime.
The AEPA provides progressively harsh penalties for defend-
ants based on the nature of the direct action. If there is damage in
excess of $10,000, the liberator may be fined and imprisoned for up
to one year.288 If a person is injured during a violation of the stat-
ute, the defendant may be fined and imprisoned for up to ten
years.28 9 A defendant may be fined and imprisoned for life if some-
one is killed during an animal liberation action.20 Finally, the stat-
ute empowers courts to order restitution to targeted animal enter-
prises for lost profits and ruined experimentation.291
283. See infra part V.B.
284. See infra part V.C.
285. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
286. 18 U.S.C.A. § 43 (Supp. 1993).
287. 18 U.S.C.A. § 43(a).
288. 18 U.S.C.A. § 43(a)
289. 18 U.S.C.A. § 43(b)(1).
290. 18 U.S.C.A. § 43(b)(2).
291. 18 U.S.C.A. § 43(c).
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The Animal Enterprise Protection Act, originally entitled the
Farm Animals and Research Facilities Protection Act, was intro-
duced to the House of Representatives by Congressman Charles
W. Stenholm (D-Tex.). 02 Stenholm's bill criminalizing "animal
rights terrorism 293 met resistance on various fronts. Some oppo-
nents of the bill argued that this legislation was redundant because
the direct action tactics encompassed by the AEPA (e.g., theft, ar-
son, property destruction) were already offenses under state law.29 4
As evidenced by previous convictions of animal liberators, these
traditional criminal statutes had already proven to be effective in
prosecuting direct action.295 In addition, many states had already
enacted laws that specifically criminalized economic sabotage by
animal liberators.96
The United States Department of Justice also discouraged en-
actment of this new legislation. Paul L. Maloney, Deputy Assistant
292. 135 CONG. REC. E3079 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1989) (statement of Rep. Stenholm).
When introducing the bill, Stenholm condemned an incident of direct action which had
occurred at his alma mater, Texas Tech University. Id.
293. Id.
294. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 61, at 38.
295. See discussion infra part V.A.
296. Since 1988, 32 states have created laws designed to protect animal enterprises
from illegal actions. Most of these statutes were enacted prior to the passage of the federal
Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992. JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 36, at 24-25; see ALA.
CODE §§ 13A-11-150 to 13A-11-154 (1994); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1023 (Supp. 1994);
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-62-201 to 5-62-204 (Michie 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-206
(West Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 828.40 to 828.43 (West 1994); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 4-11-
30 to 4-11-35 (1995); IDAHO CODE § 18-7037 (Supp. 1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 215
(Smith-Hurd 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.1 (West 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-1825 to
47-1828 (1993); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 437.410, .415, .420, .429 (MichielBobbs-Merrill
Supp. 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2799.4, 14:102.9, 14:228-228.01 (West 1991 & Supp.
1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 807 (West Supp. 1994); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 34
(Supp. 1994); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 104B (West 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 346.56, 609.552 (West 1990 & Supp. 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 578.405-.412 (Vernon
1995); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 81-30-101 to 81-30-105 (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:8-a
(Supp. 1994); N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 378 (McKinney Supp. 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-159.2 (1993 & Supp. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE 12.1-21.1 (Supp. 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, §§ 1680-1680.2 (West Supp. 1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 167.312 (1993); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 47-21-10 to 47-21-80 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 40-38-1 to
40-38-5 (Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-14-801 to 39-14-806 (Supp. 1994); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 28.08 (West Supp. 1993) (repealed 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-10-2001 to 76-
10-2002 (1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-403.4 (Michie Supp. 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 4.24.570 - 4.24.580, 9.08.080 - 9.08.090 (West Supp. 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 895.57,
943.75 (West Supp. 1994); see also Goldie Blumenstyk, More States Enact Laws to Protect
Labs from Attacks by Animal-Rights Activists; Scientists Laud Effort to Halt Vandalism,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 20, 1990, at Al (reviewing the enactment of state anti-libera-
tion laws); K. Lewis, Animal Protection: Provide for Protection of Farm Animal and Re-
search Facilities, Legislative Review, 7 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 197 (1990) (providing the legisla-
tive history of the Georgia Farm Animal and Research Facilities Protection Act).
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Attorney General for the agency's Criminal Division, testified dur-
ing a hearing for the bill:
[D]espite our sympathy to the aims of some of these bills, the Department
cannot endorse the creation of new federal criminal legislation which, in our
view, would add nothing to the prosecution of these types of offenses. In-
deed, enactment of this kind of proposal might serve only to raise the hopes
and expectations of the research community to unrealistic levels.
29 7
While proponents of the bill claimed that federal legislation was
critical for garnering increased assistance from the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) in investigating direct action, these asser-
tions were disputed by the Department of Justice.2 9 Acting Assis-
tant Attorney General Bruce Navarro stated, "[t]he Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation has never, to our knowledge, had to refrain
from entering a laboratory facility case because there was no statu-
tory basis for its involvement. '" 299
At least one member of Congress opposed the AEPA on
animal protection grounds. Representative Charles Rose (D-NC),
the only member of the House Committee on Agriculture to vote
against a precursor to the AEPA, stated:
Unfortunately, there is still very much abuse in some animal facilities ....
Many of you here will say that this is not the issue, but I very much disa-
gree. Much of the [animal liberators'] violence occurs when individuals
know that there is abuse going on, but the Department of Agriculture does
absolutely nothing to stop it.300
Nonetheless, the Animal Enterprise Protection Act was ultimately
passed at the urging of many animal enterprises, including animal
research associations and food animal lobbyists.301
297. Animal Research Hearings, supra note 37, at 86.
298. See Animal Research Hearings, supra note 37, at 7.
299. Id.
300. Louise Palmer & Elana Varon, Panel Approves Penalties for Attacks on Labs,
UPI, Apr. 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWS File, WIRES subfile.
301. See generally Animal Research Hearings, supra note 37, at 143-76 (presenting
letters and comments from animal enterprises endorsing the Animal Enterprise Protection
Act); Farm Animal Hearings, supra note 113 at 95-98, 108-67, 171-33, 238-40, 251-66, 275-
306 (displaying letters and comments from animal researchers and food animal enterprises
supporting the AEPA). Though an exhaustive list of the AEPA's proponents would be too
vast, these organizations included the National Milk Producers Federation, the American
Association of Swine Practitioners, the Houston Livestock Show and Rodeo, the National
Board of Fur Farm Organizations, the National Pork Producers Council, the National Cat-
tlemen's Association, the American Feed Industry Association, United Egg Producers, Put-
ting People First, the American Meat Institute, the American Veterinary Medical Associa-
tion, the American Association for Laboratory Animal Science, the American Medical
Association, the National Association for Biomedical Research, and the National Broiler
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One notable aspect of the AEPA is the breadth of its coverage.
Ironically, the statute's definition of animal enterprise is much
broader than those definitions used in federal animal protection
laws. The AEPA defines animal enterprise as "(A) a commercial or
academic enterprise that uses animals for food or fiber production,
agriculture, research, or testing; (B) a zoo, aquarium, circus, rodeo,
or lawful competitive animal event; or (C) any fair or similar event
intended to advance agricultural arts and sciences. 80 2 Unlike the
AEPA, federal animal protection statutes do not encompass ani-
mals on farms or at rodeos and fairs.
303
Similarly, though the AEPA does not specifically delineate a
definition of animal, the definitions found within the statute's leg-
islative history are much broader than those provided in federal
animal protection laws. Throughout much of its development, the
AEPA explicitly noted that the term animal should include "warm
or cold-blooded animals used for food, fiber production, agricul-
ture, research, education, testing, or exhibition [including] poultry,
fish, and invertebrates. 3 0 4 One version of the bill even specified
that insects were animals encompassed by the legislation 0 5 In
contrast, animal protection statutes are typically interpreted much
more narrowly.
306
Though the AEPA appears to be very extensive when con-
trasted with federal animal protection statutes, there have been
various attempts to expand its coverage even further. For example,
House Report 3064, proposed by Representative George Gekas (R-
Pa.), endeavored to protect individuals working in animal enter-
prises from direct action. This bill would have made it a federal
crime to cause "physical harm to another person or to the property
of another person in order (A) to prevent that person from partici-
pating in an animal enterprise; or (B) to retaliate against that per-
son for participating in an animal enterprise.
'30 7
Representative Stenholm also proposed substantial amend-
ments to the AEPA. House Report 3575 prohibited activities in
which a person "by force, threat of force, or physical obstruction,
intentionally injures, intimidates, or interferes with any person, or
Council. Id. at 114, 135, 155, 157, 159, 177, 189, 219, 225, 231, 276, 278-80, 288.
302. 18 U.S.C.A. § 43(d)(1).
303. See supra notes 113, 122-123 and accompanying text.
304. E.g., H.R. REP. No. 498(I), 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 808 (1992); H.R. REP. No. 953(I),
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1990).
305. 135 CONG. REc. E3080 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1989) (statement of Rep. Stenholm).
306. See supra notes 112, 119-120 and accompanying text.
307. H.R. 3064, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); see also 139 Cong. Rec. E2175 (daily ed.
Sept. 15, 1993) (remarks of Rep. Gekas in support of H.R. 3064); 139 Cong Rec. H6747
(daily ed. Sept. 14, 1993) (statement of Rep. Gekas introducing H.R. 3064).
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attempts to do so, because that person or any other person ... is
engaging in activities in an animal enterprise. "308 The bill would
have also provided additional penalties for defendants who en-
gaged in a second or subsequent offense after a prior conviction
under the AEPA.309 Finally, House Report 3575 provided that any
person aggrieved by actions barred under the statute could bring a
civil suit requesting an injunction, compensatory and punitive
damages, an award of statutory damages in the amount of $5,000
per violation, and reasonable fees for attorneys and expert wit-
nesses.3 10 Hence, if passed, this bill would have granted individual
animal users a private cause of action. In contrast, animal activists
and nonhumans themselves are commonly denied access to the
courts under current animal protection statutes. 1
Animal activists have sought legislation providing meaningful
protection for animals. Congress has responded to these requests
by providing more protection to animal users. Such a reply might
reinforce animal liberators' beliefs that lawful means of advocacy,
used alone, will not adequately protect nonhumans.
C. Grand Jury Investigations: Prosecution or Persecution?
In addition to passing the Animal Enterprise Protection Act
and similar state statutes, government has responded to animal
liberators by impaneling numerous grand juries to investigate inci-
dents of direct action. The Moscow-Pullman Daily News reports
that, from the late 1980s to 1994, approximately nine or ten grand
juries have been convened to study direct action.3 1 2 These grand
juries had been impaneled in five states: Washington, Oregon,
Utah, Michigan and Louisiana.3 13 While most of these grand juries
308. H.R. 3575, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1993).
309. Id. § 2(B).
310. Id. § 2(C).
311. See supra part III.C.
312. Ken Olsen, PETA Protests Call for Financial Records; New Subpoenas Issued,
MOSCOW-PULLMAN DAILY NEws, July 20, 1994. In 1994, the Animal Legal Defense Fund re-
ported that eight federal grand juries were impaneled to investigate Animal Liberation
Front raids occurring during 1991 and 1992. Rodney Coronado Free on $700,000 Bail, ALDF
UPDATE (Animal Legal Defense Fund, San Rafael, Cal.), Dec. 1994, at 4, 5 [hereinafter
ALDF UPDATE].
313. Ann Japenga, When the Feds Locked Up Jonathan Paul for Refusing to Testify,
the Animal Rights Movement Gained an Accidental Hero, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 1993, at El;
see also JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 36, at 24 (delineating several of the incidents being
investigated by federal grand juries); Stephen Burd, Grand Jury Indicts Animal-Rights Ac-
tivist for Bombing at Michigan State, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., July 28, 1993; Bruce Kras-
now, Suspect Writes About Group's Activities: Vandalism Investigated in Five States,
SPOKESMAN-REv. (Spokane, Wash.), Mar. 6, 1993, at A4 (reporting that at least three federal
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have been federal, at least one local grand jury has been convened
as well.3 14
Many animal rights activists claim that these investigations
are not used to begin legitimate legal actions, but to harass and
imprison animal advocates and sympathizers. According to one
activist:
Grand juries have always been used against political movements to squash
us. They were used in the 1800s to bring slaves back to the South. They've
been used against the civil rights movement, the anti-war movement, the
American Indian movement, the women's movement. This is not.., the




Hence, many animal protectors claim the government's true objec-
tive in instituting these grand juries is to persecute an unpopular
social justice movement and intimidate sympathizers.31'
There appears to be some evidence supporting the activists'
claims. Dozens of animal rights activists, acquaintances of alleged
animal liberators, and sympathizers of the animal protection move-
ment have been subpoenaed, sometimes repeatedly, to testify
before grand juries investigating direct action.1 In addition, at
least six individuals have been charged with contempt of court and
jailed for refusing to cooperate with grand jury investigations.
Henry Hutto and Debra Ann Young were jailed in connection
with a federal grand jury investigation in Sacramento, California.
grand juries have been impaneled).
314. After an investigation by local authorities in Oregon, Crescenzo Vellucci, Jr., Bill J.
Keogh, and Jonathan C. Mark Paul, were charged with second-degree burglary, theft, crimi-
nal mischief, and conspiracy to commit burglary for their alleged participation, along with
Roger Troen, in the October 1986 break-in at the University at Oregon. These charges were
later dropped. Dan Bernstein, Judge Dismisses Charges in Animal-Rights Case, SACRA-
MENTO BEE, May 2, 1991, at B3; Bill Bishop, UO Lab Charges Dismissed: But Case Against
3 in Break-in Could Be Reinstated, REG.-GUARD, May 2, 1991; Man Held, Accused of Theft
at UO Labs: The Sacramento Suspect Has Been a Local Spokesman for the Militant
Animal Liberation Front, OREGONIAN, Oct. 15, 1990, at B1.
315. Japenga, supra note 313, at El.
316. See generally BRIAN GLICK, WAR AT HolM: COVERT ACTION AGAINST U.S. AcrIvIsTs
AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT (1989) (reviewing the United States' use of the legal system
to harass political activists); Michael E. Deutsch, The Improper Use of the Federal Grand
Jury: An Instrument for the Internment of Political Activists, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 1159 (1984) (discussing government's use of federal grand juries to imprison radical
political activists without charging them).
317. FINSEN & FINSEN, supra note 12, at 176; Ken Olsen, ALF Raid Wreaking Havoc
Still: Feds Hunt Minister's Family in Michigan, MOSCOW-PULLMAN DAILY NEws, Sept. 13,
1992, at 1A; Ken Olsen, Animal Activists Say That Feds Are Harassing Them, Moscow-
PULLMAN DAILY NEWS, July 4-5, 1992, at 1A; Michael Satchell, Pursuing PETA, U.S. NEws
AND WORLD REP., Sept. 21, 1992, at 19; Kit Wharton, Animal Rights Group Targets Har-
rods' Pate, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH LTD., Nov. 28, 1993, at 11.
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The Sacramento grand jury was investigating an April 1987 arson
at the Animal Diagnostic Laboratory under construction at the
University at California, Davis. This direct action caused $3.5 to
$4.5 million in damage. Hutto was jailed forty-five days for his re-
fusal to assist the grand jury.318 Young was jailed for two days
when she refused to name her associates in the animal rights
movement. She was released from prison after agreeing to aid the
Sacramento grand jury's investigation. While in jail, Young was al-
legedly denied counsel and access to the prescription medication
she used to maintain her blood pressure.319
Four persons were jailed for contempt of court for allegedly
refusing to testify before a federal grand jury investigating the Au-
gust 1991 ALF break-in at the Washington State University
(WSU) Fur Animal Research Farm in Pullman. During the raid,
twenty-three animals were released, including seven coyotes, six
minks, and ten mice.32 0 Damages from the incident totalled ap-
proximately $50,000. These losses included the theft of research
documents and destruction of computer equipment.32 1 Jonathan
Paul, who apparently was not a suspect in the WSU case, was im-
prisoned approximately 156 days for his refusal to identify other
activists in photographs.2 2 Deborah Stout, believed by authorities
to be a participant in the WSU incident, was jailed five months for
her refusal to testify before the grand jury. 23 In addition,
Kimberly Jean Trimiew, an organic farmer and a suspect in the
WSU raid, was also imprisoned for approximately five months due
to her refusal to cooperate.3 24
318. Hutto was reportedly placed in solitary confinement and lost approximately
twenty pounds during his incarceration because, as a vegan, he could not eat most of the
prison fare provided to him. FINSEN & FINSEN, supra note 12, at 176; 4 of 5 Jailed Activists
Stayed Quiet, MOSCOW-PULLMAN DAILY NEWS, Oct. 20, 1993, at 1A.
319. Grand Jury Jails Animal Rights Activist, ANIMALS' VOICE MAG., Oct. 1990, at 56;
see also FINSEN & FINSEN, supra note 12, at 176.
320. PETA, History of Liberation, supra note 55.
321. Id.
322. Paul was a friend and former roommate of Rodney Coronado, the leading suspect
in the WSU incident. FINSEN & FINSEN, supra note 12, at 176; Ann Japenga, supra note 313,
at El; Bruce Krasnow, Not-So-Active Activist Becomes Hero: Paul's Refusal to Testify
About WSU Animal Raid Takes on Life of Its Own, SPOKEsMAN-REv. (Spokane, Wash.),
Mar. 6, 1993, at Al; Bill Morlin, Judge Frees Activist After 156 Days In Jail, SPOKESMAN-
REV. (Spokane, Wash.), Apr. 10, 1993, at Al; Ken Olsen, Transcripts Show Why Paul Was
Jailed, MOSCOW-PULLmAN DAILY NEWS, Dec. 5-6, 1992.
323. Across the USA- News From Every State (Washington), USA TODAY, July 22,
1994, at 9A; Bob Payne & Jim McNett, The News Briefly, NEWS Tftm., March 30, 1994, at
A2.
324. Dean Kuipers, The Tracks of the Coyote, ROLLING STONE, June 1, 1995, at 58; Ken
Olsen, Seattle Activist Gets Grand Jury Reprieve, MOSCOW-PULLMAN DAILY NEWS, Aug. 1,
1994. See also Around the Region: Grand Jury Ends Probe of WSU Raid; Outcome Un-
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Perhaps the most notorious use of these grand juries, however,
may be the imprisonment of author and graduate student Rik
Scarce. Although not a suspect, Scarce was incarcerated for 159
days when he refused to reveal the sources for his book, Eco-War-
riors, to the grand jury investigating the WSU raid.2 6
Scarce appealed his imprisonment for contempt to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. 27 Claiming a scholar's privilege under
the First Amendment3 28 and federal common law, Scarce argued
that the names of his confidential sources were privileged informa-
tion protected from grand jury inquiry. The appellate court rebuf-
fed Scarce's First Amendment claim by invoking the balancing test
of Branzburg v. Hayes.32 9 The court stated:
[W]e perceive no basis for holding that the public interest in law enforce-
ment and in ensuring effective grand jury proceedings is insufficient to over-
ride the consequential, but uncertain, burden on news gathering that is said
to result from insisting that reporters, like other citizens, respond to rele-
vant questions put to them in the course of a valid grand jury investigation
or criminal trial.3 30
The court also found that Scarce had no scholar's privilege as a
matter of federal common law because the confidentially obtained
information was "relevant to a legitimate grand jury inquiry and
sought in good faith."'1 31 Thus, the Ninth Circuit rejected Scarce's
claim regarding a scholar's privilege and upheld his confinement.
In response to animal protectors' contentions of harassment,
known, LEWISTON MORNING TRm., Dec. 10, 1993, at 1C; Bill Morlin, Woman Jailed for Re-
fusing to Testify About Raid Farmer a Suspect in WSU Animal Raid, SPOKESMAN-REV.
(Spokane, Wash.), Oct. 6, 1993, at B1.
325. SCARCE, supra note 35. Eco-Warriors is a book about militant environmental
groups, such as the ALF, Earth First!, and the Sea Shepherds.
326. For background on the Scarce case, see Peter Monaghan, Sociologist Jailed Be-
cause He 'Wouldn't Snitch' Ponders the Way Research Ought to Be Done, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., Sept. 1, 1993, at A8; Ken Olsen, Scarce Set Free After 159 Days, MOSCOW-PULLMAN
DAmY NEWS, Oct. 20, 1993, at IA; Nicole Peradotto, Jailed Researcher; Supreme Court
Holds the Key: Rik Scarce Appeals for Freedom, LEWISTON MORNING TRm., Sept. 7, 1993,
at 5A; Nicole Peradotto, Scarce Freed: Judge Releases WSU Grad Student Jailed for Re-
fusing to Divulge Names of Those Suspected in Research Raid, LEWISTON MORNING TRm.,
Oct. 21, 1993, at 1A.
327. In re Scarce v. United States, 5 F.3d 397 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct.
685 (1994).
328. The First Amendment provides, "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONsT. amend. I (emphasis added).
329. 408 U.S. 665 (1971).
330. 5 F.3d at 401.
331. Id. at 403.
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some government officials argue that these grand jury investiga-
tions are lawful and that incarceration of activists is necessary to
stimulate compliance.33 2 For example, Jim Provencher, Spokesman
for the Seattle field division of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms (ATF) asserted, "These are serious crimes we're investi-
gating .... If you commit crimes that fall within ATF jurisdiction,
we're going to pursue you. We are not investigating people for their
beliefs .... We are not going against people for who they are.
We're talking tenacious investigation of serious felonies."
333
Similarly, when asked in a Los Angeles Times interview why
activists testifying before the grand jury may not have an attorney
present though they can be jailed for up to eighteen months with-
out charges being filed, Bill Hyslop, the U.S. Attorney for eastern
Washington, responded that the process was "totally legal, totally
constitutional. 3 3 4 He explained that witnesses cannot have an at-
torney present because the purpose of the grand jury is not to de-
termine innocence or guilt but to assess whether charges should be
filed. 5 Hyslop added that the jailing was not punitive but rather
was intended to "compel" testimony.33 6
These grand jury inquiries have produced one conviction. In a
five-count indictment, a Michigan federal grand jury charged ac-
tivist Rodney A. Coronado with arson, destruction of government
property, theft, use of an unregistered explosive, and violation of
the Hobbs Act. These charges were related to an alleged Animal
Liberation Front arson at a Michigan State University (MSU)
mink research laboratory in February 1992.3
37
In 1995, Coronado pled guilty to aiding and abetting the ALF
raid on MSU. He also pleaded guilty to theft of property for an
incident unrelated to animal liberation activities.338 Coronado, who
332. Japenga, supra note 313, at El.
333. Id.
334. Id. at E2.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. During the raid, a fire destroyed thirty-two years of research files regarding experi-
ments with minks. It has been estimated that this direct action caused $125,000 to $250,000
in damage to buildings and equipment. Michael Hedges, Animal-Rights Activist Indicted
for Arson at Lab, WASH. TiMES, July 17, 1993, at A3; Michigan Grand Jury Indicts Animal
Extremist Rodney Coronado, PR Newswire, July 16, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, NEWS file, WIRES subfile. After a fourteen month search, Coronado was arrested at
the Pasqcua Indian Reservation outside of Tucson, Arizona. Animal Rights Activist Is Ar-
rested for Arson, CHi. Tam., Sept. 29, 1994, at 3; Animal Rights Fugitive Rodney Coronado
Arrested, PR Newswire, Sept. 28, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWS file,
WIRES subfile.
338. Ken Olsen, Coronado Pleads to Helping ALF at MSU: Activist Takes Fall for
WSU Damage, Too, MOSCOW-PULLMN DALy NEws, March 4 & 5, 1995, at lA, 9A.
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is part Yaqui (a Native American Tribe) and part Mexican, 1e al-
legedly stole and destroyed a calvaryman's journal that "glorified
Native American genocide. 3 40 Coronado's plea may have been
largely attributable to this separate incident of theft. Ken Olsen,
staff writer for the Moscow-Pullman Daily News, reports:
In the end, it appears that Coronado's impulsive theft of a soldier's diary
from the Little Bighorn Battlefield Museum, not evidence from animal
rights cases, gave the government the leverage it needed to get him to take a
plea bargain.... [T]he government revealed that it had solid evidence that
Coronado stole a calvaryman's journal from the museum near Custer's Last
Stand in Montana in 1992. There was an eyewitness who put Coronado at
the scene. Experts had lifted 13 latent fingerprints from the glass display
case where the journal was kept.... Coronado faced 10 years in prison on
that charge alone, a charge he would have likely been convicted on. '
As a result of his plea, Coronado was sentenced in August 1995 to
fifty-seven months in prison3 42 and ordered to pay $2.5 million in
restitution to institutions and businesses damaged by animal rights
activists. 43
Given the considerable exertion by law enforcement and the
lengthy imprisonments of persons not suspected of criminal activ-
ity, the return appears small - one conviction that arguably re-
sulted from evidence unrelated to animal liberation activity. Al-
though these law enforcement efforts may fall within legal
guidelines, the activists' claims of harassment may have some
merit. The government may be treading a fine line between zealous
inquiry and hysterical inquest.
D. RICO
Prosecutors and animal enterprises will probably also use the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) chapter
of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970344 to bring criminal
339. Kuipers, supra note 324, at 54.
340. Rod Coronado Sentenced, ARIZONA EARTH FirST! (Arizona Earth Firstl, Tucson,
AZ), Aug. 1995, at 2.
341. Olsen, supra note 338, at 9A.
342. Dennis Anderson, Activist Sentenced, STAR Tam., Sept. 3, 1995, at 18C. This sen-
tence was six months greater than the maximum delineated in Coronado's plea agreement.
Rod Coronado Sentenced, supra note 340, at 2.
343. Anderson, supra note 342, at 18C. Coronado was directed to pay restitution to
various animal research and fur facilities. Designated centers include Michigan State Uni-
versity, Oregon State University, Washington State University, Northwest Fur Breeders,
Malecky Mink Farm, and the Fuggans Rocky Mountain Fur Company. Rod Coronado Sen-
tenced, supra note 340, at 2.
344. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968 (West 1984 & Supp. 1994).
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and civil claims against animal liberators. The use of RICO against
politically motivated activism was condoned by the U.S. Supreme
Court in NOW v. Scheidler
3 45
In Scheidler, petitioner health care centers s brought a RICO
claim against a coalition of anti-abortion groups called the Pro-
Life Action Network (PLAN).3 47 The petitioners asserted that
through a pattern of racketeering activity, PLAN was engaged in a
nationwide conspiracy to close abortion clinics. The health care
centers claimed that "respondents conspired to use threatened or
actual force, violence or fear to induce clinic employees, doctors,
and patients to give up their jobs, give up their economic right to
practice medicine, and give up their right to obtain medical ser-
vices at the clinics. 3 48 Petitioners further alleged that the "con-
spiracy 'has injured their business and/or property interests.' M49
The district and circuit courts initially dismissed this case on the
grounds that the health care centers failed to state a claim under
RICO.35 0 Petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court.
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that for a claim to be
asserted under RICO, racketeering activities do not need to have
an underlying economic (i.e., profit-seeking) motive. 51 The Court
explained that neither the explicit terms of the offense, 52 nor
RICO's definition of racketeering activity,35 specified that a profit
345. National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
346. Petitioners in Scheidler included the National Organization for Women (NOW)
and two abortion providers, Delaware Women's Health Organization, Inc. (DWHO) and
Summit Women's Health Organization, Inc. (SWHO). Id. at 801. The Court held that
DWHO and SWHO had standing to sue under RICO. Id. at 802-03.
347. PLAN was composed of individuals and groups that opposed the legal availability
of abortions. Id. at 801. Other respondents named in the complaint were Joseph Scheidler,
John Patrick Ryan, Randall A. Terry, Andrew Scholberg, Conrad Wojnar, Timothy Murphy,
Monica Migliorino, Vital-Med Laboratories, Inc., Pro-Life Action League, Inc., Pro-Life Di-
rect Action League, Inc., Operation Rescue, and Project Life. Id. at 801 n.1.
348. Id. at 801-02.
349. Id. at 802.
350. National Org. of Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 968 F. 2d 612 (7th Cir. 1992), aff'g 765
F. Supp. 937 (N.D. IlM. 1991), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
351. Id.
352. RICO provides, "[iut shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign com-
merce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity .... " 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c).
353. RICO gives the following definition of racketeering activity:
(A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery,
bribery, extortion, ... which is chargeable under State law and punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of
the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to
bribery) .... section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act
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motive was integral to a RICO violation.5 4 As a result, the Court
held that the petitioners could bring suit even though PLAN's al-
legedly violent actions were motivated by ethical rather than eco-
nomic reasons.
It is likely that the holding in Scheidler will impact various
ideologically based groups that use illegal tactics but lack a profit
motive. Robert Sedler, a constitutional law professor at Wayne
State University, explains:
[If animal rights activists block the entrance to fur stores or go into stores
and spray paint on the furs, the furriers could bring a RICO claim against
them. Same thing if environmentalists trespass on somebody's property....
Peaceful picketing, debate, meetings, prayers - all of that is protected by
the First Amendment. But when you go over the limit, there is a federal
cause of action against you .... 35
Thus, in addition to affecting abortion protesters, the application
of RICO to advocacy groups could impact animal rights activists
and other protestors who employ illegal means, such as nuclear
arms protesters, AIDS activists, civil rights demonstrators, and
radical environmentalists. 58
The institution of RICO claims against animal liberators could
be very desirable to animal enterprises. Under RICO, triple dam-
indictable under section 659 is felonious .... section 1029 (relating to fraud and
related activity in connection with access devices) .... section 1341 (relating to
mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud) .... section 1503 (relating to
obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investiga-
tions), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement),
section 1512 (relating to tampering with a witness, victim, or informant), section
1513 (relating to retaliating against a witness, victim, or informant), section 1951
(relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (re-
lating to racketeering) .... section 1958 (relating to use of interstate commerce
facilities in the commission of murder-for-hire), sections 2312 and 2313 (relating
to interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles), sections 2314 and 2315 (re-
lating to interstate transportation of stolen property) ....
18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1).
354. 114 S. Ct. at 803-06.
355. Jacquelynn Boyle, Justices Give Abortion Clinics a New Defense: Foes May Face
Racketeering Suits, DET. FREE PRESS, Jan. 25, 1994, at 1A.
356. See also Aaron Epstein, Justices Give Abortion Sites a Key Weapon: A Federal
Anti-Racketeering Law Can Be Used Against Activists Who Conspire to Block Clinics,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 25, 1994, at Al ("Briefs filed with the high court argued that applying
RICO to advocacy groups could imperil the rights of nuclear arms protesters, AIDS activ-
ists, civil rights demonstrators and animal rights advocates, among others."); David G. Sav-
age, Court Allows Abortion Suits Under RICO, L.A. Tirms, Jan. 25, 1994, at Al ("[The
Scheidler] ruling also gives government prosecutors the power to use the law against any
terrorist organization that uses violence for political reasons. Similarly, it would permit law-
suits against animal rights activists, environmental extremists or others who use force or
violence to achieve their goals.").
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ages and attorneys' fees may be assessed against unsuccessful de-
fendants.3 57 Consequently, animal enterprises would have substan-
tial economic incentive to bring suit against above-ground animal
rights activists engaging in public acts of civil disobedience, as well
as any animal liberators who are successfully identified.
The scientific community is already exploring the potential for
such litigation. The future use of RICO was addressed at a sympo-
sium held by the National Association for Biomedical Research.
Here, attorney David Hardy stated, "'the RICO statute has obvi-
ous application to ALF and, quite likely, to the above-ground par-
allel groups which aid and finance its activities.'"" He added:
"'The RICO statutes offer the prospect of imposing sanctions not
only against ALF and other underground groups, but also against
members and directors of the above-ground parallel organizations
which conduct trespass demonstrations, home picketing, and other
harassment of animal researchers.' "3511 Lorenz Otto Lutherer and
Margaret Sheffield Simon, authors of Targeted: The Anatomy of
an Animal Rights Attack, concur:
[A]s the scientific community organizes to fight this battle [against animal
rights activists] and as funds are raised for future action, it is inevitable
that such RICO suits will be brought. They hold the most promise not only
for subduing the movement in the courtroom but also for damaging the
movement in the minds of the general public. RICO laws have come to sym-
bolize protection against gangsters, and after well-publicized convictions
under these statutes, the general public would be much less eager to donate
money to groups linked with gangsterism.3 60
Thus, the future use of RICO against animal liberators appears al-
most certain.
VI. IMPLEMENTING CHANGE
[T]he time will come when men... will look upon the murder of animals as
they now look upon the murder of men.
- Leonardo da Vjnci361
In the United States, the use of animals is pervasive. Although
357. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c).
358. LUTHERER & SIMON, supra note 37, at 141.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 142.
361. PHILIP KAPLEAU, To CHERISH ALL LIFE: A BUDDHIST CASE FOR BECOMING VEGETA-
RIAN 82 (1981) (quoting Leonardo da Vinci's notes); see generally, CHARLES D. NIVEN, His-
TORY OF THE HUMANE MOVEMENT 38-40 (1967) (examining Leonardo da Vinci's commitment
to the well-being of animals).
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most persons agree that nonhumans experience pain and pleasure,
many resist the idea of animal rights. This longstanding, wide-
spread acceptance of animal exploitation has produced cultural,
political, economic, and philosophical barriers to change. Human-
kind's narrow ethical circle has also led to prejudice in the law. In
the case of animal use and abuse, the legal system delivers no jus-
tice. Ineffective humane legislation and standing barriers allow the
oppression of nonhumans to proceed virtually unchecked.
For these reasons, animal liberators perceive that lawful
means of advocacy, used alone, are currently inadequate to secure
meaningful animal protection and ignite a radical change in the
United States' policies towards nonhumans. The liberators' per-
ceptions may be correct. Prospects for the immediate end of
animal abuse are dismal. For those who count the losses animal by
animal - thousands every minute in the U.S. alone3 2 - anything
but immediate reform is cause for revolt, or direct action.
This Comment advocates change. Rather than shielding the
status quo, there must be a substantial shift in humankind's rela-
tionship with animals. It is time to move away from an economy
and way of life based on animal oppression. Policies favoring the
subjugation of nonhumans should be upended. This transforma-
tion can begin by implementing three progressive, yet incremental
steps: (1) the backlash against liberators should be tempered; (2)
abolitionist animal protection statutes must be created; and, (3) at
least some animals should be granted legal standing to pursue rem-
edies for their injuries. While these steps, at least initially, will not
entirely close the gap between animal users and animal liberators,
they will begin to narrow the breach.
A. Dismantling the Backlash
In the period between 1793 and 1850, rather than dismantle
institutionalized slavery, the United States responded to the un-
lawful liberation of Africans by developing and amending the Fugi-
tive Slave Act. 63 This statute was designed to crush dissent and
stop lawlessness. The United States has instituted a similar back-
lash against animal liberators. Rather than challenge animal ex-
ploitation and the substantial barriers to change, government has
attempted to deter direct action by punishing liberators. In addi-
tion to yielding minimal results, these efforts fail to recognize that
animal liberation is not necessarily symptomatic of lawlessness and
362. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
363. Fugitive Slave Act, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302 (1793), amended by ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (1850),
repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XHI.
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anarchy, but may result from oppression and subjugation. Just as
the conductors of the Underground Railroad violated the law to
aid enslaved Africans, liberators circumvent the law so they may
assist animals threatened by harm.
A variety of things may be done to begin dismantling the
backlash against animal liberators while at the same time not giv-
ing carte blanche to individuals who take the law into their own
hands. When animal liberators are prosecuted under traditional
criminal statutes, they should be permitted to present the neces-
sity defense to the jury. Under such a system, activists may still be
convicted, yet they would be given a voice and a fairer trial. In
addition, government should cease dumping resources into the cre-
ation and strengthening of redundant legislation such as the
Animal Enterprise Protection Act. Resources could instead be used
to strengthen and enforce anti-cruelty statutes. Finally, grand jury
investigations should be moderated. While some crimes may war-
rant investigation, non-suspects, such as Rik Scarce and Jonathan
Paul, should not be jailed for up to five months at a time. These
steps would provide an opportunity for liberators to educate the
public about animal abuse while still providing society with a
means to condemn any acts it believes to be wrong.
B. Abolitionist Statutes
In addition to controlling the backlash against liberators, abo-
litionist animal protection statutes should be created and enforced.
As evidenced by the Humane Slaughter Act, the Twenty-Eight
Hour Law, the Animal Welfare Act, and state anti-cruelty statutes,
current efforts to manage animal use provide little substantive pro-
tection for nonhumans. To protect nonhumans, legislatures should
begin making abolitionist statutes.
There are some indications that the populace might be ready
to abolish several forms of animal use. For example, a 1993 poll by
the Los Angeles Times found that "half or more [of the] Ameri-
cans surveyed agree with two principal tenets of the animal protec-
tionist cause - they are opposed to sport hunting and the wearing
of fur. ' 364 Similarly, it is likely that the public would support an
end to the testing of cosmetics, cigarettes, and alcohol on animals.
Sweden, one of the most progressive countries regarding animal
protection, has already banned such tests. 65 Over time, similar
bans could be made regarding the use of animals in entertainment
364. John Balzar, Creatures Great and - Equal?, L.A. Tiras, Dec. 25, 1993, at Al.
365. Margaret Doley, Using Animals in Medical Research: Scandinavia, 306 BMJ:
BRIT. MED. J. 1019, 1021 (1993).
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(e.g., circuses,66 rodeos, dog races) and the eating of animal flesh.
These and other abolitionist acts would gradually, yet successfully,
make humans less culturally, philosophically, and economically de-
pendent on the use of nonhumans.
C. Standing for Animals
Under the law, nonhumans are mere property much like any
other object. Property does not have inherent rights; rather, it is
owned by rights holders. This lack of personhood has a profound
impact on the treatment of animals. While courts have recently
begun to hear suits raising the question of the sentimental value of
animals, this viewpoint still looks to the damage suffered by the
human owner rather than the injury to the nonhuman.36 7 This
viewpoint fails to acknowledge that an action impacts an animal
independent of the repercussions on any human being.366
Rights should be endowed upon animals themselves. Many
scholars have argued that animals deserve legal recognition of their
inherent rights because they may be injured, they have interests,
and they may directly benefit from legal rights.36 9 If animals were
granted personhood, they would have standing themselves and
could pursue remedies for their injuries through a legal
representative.
3 70
Various arguments are commonly put forth to challenge legal
rights for animals. Oftentimes it is argued that only human beings
may have legal rights. However, under the law as it presently ex-
ists, it is clear that many non-humans are endowed with per-
sonhood. Corporations, ships, trusts, joint ventures, municipalities,
and nation-states enjoy legal rights. In fact, it has even been de-
bated whether personhood should be extended to other unconven-
tional entities such as lakes, mountains, tribes, artifacts, future
366. Several localities in the United States have proposed, and sometimes succeeded, in
banning the performance of certain circus animals in their jurisdictions. Richard H. Chacon,
Quincy Ban Awaits Mayor's Signature, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 23, 1995, at 26; John Milne,
Bill to End Exotic Circus-Animal Acts in N.H. Draws a Crowd, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 23,
1995, at Metro 26.
367. FRANcIoNE, ANIMALs AND PROPERTY, supra note 116, at 54-63.
368. REGAN, ALL THAT DwELL THEREIN, supra note 177, at 159-74.
369. Id. at 153-55.
370. Several writers have suggested the implementation of a guardian model for ani-
mals. E.g., ROLLIN, supra note 16, at 81 (stating that "the most plausible candidates [to
press the rights of animals are] members of humane societies and veterinarians"); Gary L.
Francione, Personhood, Property and Legal Competence, in THE GREAT APE PROJECT:
EQUALITY BEYOND HUMANITY 248, 254-56 (Paola Cavalieri & Peter Singer eds., 1993) (exam-
ining the intricacies of a guardianship model to protect the legal rights of great apes); Tis-
chler, supra note 17.
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generations, and artificial intelligences.371
Similarly, some opponents of personhood for animals have ar-
gued that only those individuals who can themselves press claims
can enjoy legal rights. Fetuses, 72 infants, some persons who are
mentally disabled, corporations, municipalities, and many other
entities, however, frequently press claims via guardians or other
representatives even though they cannot appear in court, speak, or
sign their names.
3 73
The law is not static. This country's definition of personhood
has changed throughout history. Each expansion, ranging from
children to women to African-Americans, was met with some resis-
tance by skeptics. In Should Trees Have Standing? - Toward Le-
gal Rights for Natural Objects, author Christopher Stone explains:
Throughout legal history, each successive extension of rights to some new
entity has been, theretofore, a bit unthinkable. We are inclined to suppose
the rightlessness of rightless 'things' to be a decree of Nature, not a legal
convention acting in support of some status quo.... And so the United
States Supreme Court could straight-facedly tell us in Dred Scott that
Blacks had been denied the rights of citizenship 'as a subordinate and infer-
ior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race .... s74
371. Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. Rv.
1231 (1992) (considering whether artificial intelligences could become legal persons); Stone,
Standing I, supra note 174, at 456 (proposing that legal rights be endowed in forests,
oceans, rivers, and other natural objects in the environment); Christopher D. Stone, Should
Trees Have Standing? Revisited: How Far Will Law and Morals Reach? A Pluralist Per-
spective, 59 S. CAL. L. REy. 1 (1985) (providing an expansive inquiry into the legal and
moral status of unconventional entities).
372. In many states, nonconsensual pregnancy termination has been classified as fetal
murder, homicide, or feticide. In these jurisdictions, a right to be free from injury attaches
to the procreative product rather than the pregnant woman. For instance, Illinois criminal-
izes the "intentional homicide of an unborn child" which it defines as "any individual of the
human species from fertilization until birth." ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, para. 5/9-1.2
(Smith Hurd 1993). The Tennessee Code contains a provision entitled "Viable Fetus as a
Victim." This statute explicitly specifies that the terms another, individual, individuals,
and another person include a viable fetus for purposes of acts prohibited by the state's
criminal code. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107 (1991). Similarly, Utah's criminal homicide
statute specifies that the term human being includes an unborn child for the purposes of
the state's criminal homicide statute. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201(1)(a) (1995).
373. Stone, Standing I, supra note 174, at 464. Stone argues:
It is not inevitable, nor is it wise, that natural objects should have no rights to
seek redress in their own behalf. It is no answer to say that streams and forests
cannot have standing because streams and forests cannot speak. Corporations can-
not speak either; nor can states, estates, infants, incompetents, municipalities or
universities. Lawyers speak for them, as they customarily do for the ordinary citi-
zen with legal problems.
Id.
374. Id. at 453.
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As this country's ethical circle expands, concerns that the law will
plunge into anarchy or chaos should not prevent the United States'
legal system from once again extending the concept of per-
sonhood.3 75 Treating animals as rights holders can be implemented
gradually. Even many non-abolitionists would agree that animals
such as primates, whales, dolphins, dogs, and cats deserve as much
legal standing as a corporation, ship, or trust. Once rights have
been extended to a species other than homo sapiens, more may
follow in time. By endowing personhood upon animals and thereby
eliminating their status as mere property, rights for animals and
effective advocacy on behalf of nonhumans could become the
norm.
D. Epilogue
Perhaps many feel that the imprisonment of animal liberators
places a wall of safety between society and lawlessness. But behind
the doors of laboratories, the gates of farms, and the bars of zoos
lay innumerable acts of violence and iniquity. By failing to stop
the oppression of nonhumans while investing vast resources to
punish their champions, the United States sanctions these atroci-
ties. The United States must reassess its reaction to infrequent
acts of animal liberation and channel its efforts toward ending the
more frequent and grievous violations upon nonhumans.
Where the law perpetuates and condones cruelty, as it does by
its failure to ensure animal protection, some may appeal to a
higher order of justice.376 It is time to change society's policy of
penalizing animal liberators and defending animal users. No doubt
the Underground Railroad, the Boston Tea Party, and the Nazi
resistance movement 3"7 made those in power feel as though law
and order were imperiled. As history teaches, however, today's law
may be tomorrow's shame; today's criminals may be tomorrow's
heroes.
375. REGAN, ALL THAT DWELL THEREIN, supra note 177, at 162.
376. JASPER & NELKIN, supra note 13, at 2 (explaining that some animal liberators be.
lieve they appeal to a higher law when they damage property to stop violence against living
beings).
377. In his writings, author Isaac Bashevis Singer has compared the slaughter of
nonhumans to the oppression of Jews. See, e.g., Isaac Bashevis Singer, The Letter Writer
and Other Stories, in THE EXTENDED CIRCLE: A COMMONPLACE BOOK OF ANIMAL RIGHTS 335
(Jon Wynne-Tyson ed., 1989) (e.g., "[A]U people are Nazis; for the animals it is an eternal
Treblinka.").
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